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509 
OVERGENERALIZATION OF THE HOT PURSUIT 
DOCTRINE PROVIDES ANOTHER BLOW TO THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT IN MIDDLETOWN V. FLINCHUM† 
It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and 
seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively 
unreasonable.* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Unreasonable searches of the home have often been regarded as a 
serious infringement upon one’s right to privacy.1  The right to privacy 
is currently recognized by a variety of governments and has existed for 
hundreds of years.2  Although the Constitution does not grant an express 
right to privacy,3 the Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged the 
 
 † Middletown v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330 (Ohio 2002).  
 * Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). 
 1. James G. Sotos, Despite Lack of Warrant, Arrest Was Proper: Court, CHI. DAILY L. 
BULL., Oct. 20, 1994, at 6 (“The adage ‘A man’s home is his castle’ perhaps best explains why 
constitutional protections against the long arm of the law are at their greatest when the police 
attempt to intrude on the sanctity of the home.”).  Stanley H.  Friedelbaum, The Quest for Privacy: 
State Courts and an Elusive Right, 65 ALB. L. REV. 945 (2002) (discussing right of privacy as 
interpreted and applied to States). 
 2. David Banisar, Privacy and Human Rights, an International Survey of Privacy Laws and 
Practice, Global Internet Liberty Campaign, available at http://www.gilc.org/privacy/survey/intro. 
html (last visited Feb. 3, 2003). In discussing the origins of the right to privacy the author noted: 
The law of privacy can be traced as far back as 1361, when the Justices of the Peace Act 
in England provided for the arrest of peeping toms and eavesdroppers.  In 1765, British 
Lord Camden, striking down a warrant to enter a house and seize papers wrote, “We can 
safely say there is no law in this country to justify the defendants in what they have 
done; if there was, it would destroy all the comforts of society, for papers are often the 
dearest property any man can have.” 
Id. (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 1558-1774 All E.R. Rep. 45 (K.B. 1765)). 
 3. See generally Adam Hickey, Between Two Spheres: Comparing State and Federal 
Approaches to the Right to Privacy and Prohibitions Against Sodomy, 111 YALE L.J. 993 (2002) 
(discussing relationship between homosexuals’ right to privacy and sodomy laws); Tracie B. 
Loring, An Analysis of the Informational Privacy Protection Afforded by the European Union and 
the United States, 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 421 (2002) (comparing European information privacy laws to 
those of the United States). 
1
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rights of personal privacy and zones of privacy.4  Affording extra 
protection to the home seems to show that our right to privacy is at its 
peak behind closed doors.5 
Unfortunately, the list of exceptions to the warrant requirement is 
large6 and continuously growing.7  These exceptions will undoubtedly 
infringe upon our right to privacy and further erode Fourth Amendment 
protections.8  Some scholars feel that liberal interpretations of such 
exceptions will eventually eliminate the objectives behind the Fourth 
Amendment.9  For example, increasing the number of exceptions to the 
 
 4. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973). Justice Blackmun acknowledged: 
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.  In a line of decisions, 
however . . . the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of 
certain areas of zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.  In varying contexts, 
the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the 
First Amendment . . .; in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments . . . in the penumbras of the 
Bill of Rights . . .; in the Ninth Amendment . . . or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by 
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Id. (citations omitted), quoted in Alain A. Levasseur, Legitimacy of Judges, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 43, 
81 (2002) (discussing theoretical approaches to the legitimacy of the judicial branch). 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (stating 
“physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is 
directed.”), cited with approval in Payton, 445 U.S. at 585-86. 
 6. See Jeffrey Haningan Kuras et al., Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 90 GEO. L.J. 1130 
(2002) (providing a list of recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement). 
 7. Sherri Schuck,  Letting the End Justify the Means: The Continuing Dissolution of the 
Fourth Amendment’s Requirement for Search Warrants, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 350 (2001) (discussing 
expansion of the exception by allowing courts to continue to determine exigent circumstances with 
a variety of factors); Darrel C. Waugh, Note, Constitutional Law-Developing Guidelines in Fourth 
Amendment “Clothing Cases” After United States v. Butler, 16 W. NEW ENG. L.REv. 289, 292 
(1994) (providing background of the large amount of exceptions to the warrant rule). 
 8. See generally Kuras, supra note 6.  The author explained how the warrant requirement 
can be avoided with the following exceptions: 
There are, however, many exceptions to the probable cause and warrant requirements, 
including investigatory detentions, warrantless arrests, searches incident to a valid arrest, 
seizure of items in plain view, exigent circumstances, consent searches, vehicle searches, 
container searches, inventory searches, border searches, searches at sea, administrative 
searches, and searches in which the special needs of law enforcement make the probable 
cause and warrant requirements impracticable. 
Id. Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriguez 
Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and Exaggerates the 
Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1991) (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
willingness to disregard settled doctrine while expanding exceptions to the Fourth Amendment). 
 9. Emily Sovell, Note, State v. Hanson: Has the Exigent Circumstances Exception to the 
Warrant Requirement Swallowed the Rule?, 45 S.D. L. REV. 163 (2000) (criticizing the South 
Dakota Supreme Court’s determination relative to exigent circumstances in State v. Hanson).  See 
generally John Barnoski, Note, Fourth Amendment – Knock-and-Announce Rule – Common Law 
“Knock and Announce” Principle forms Part of Reasonableness Inquiry Under Fourth Amendment 
Wilson v. Arkansas, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1231 (1996) (arguing recent decisions concerning 
the Fourth Amendment have been ambiguous and have failed to adequately protect our Fourth 
2
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warrant rule provides a greater chance for police error, bias, and abuse, 
thus escalating unreasonable searches and invasions of privacy.10  
Requiring members of the judicial branch to determine probable cause 
reduces the chance of unreasonable searches because a neutral individual 
is less likely to suffer from partiality.11  Therefore, to protect our right to 
privacy the Supreme Court has found that exceptions to the warrant 
requirement are carefully constructed and few in number.12 
The Ohio Supreme Court held that hot pursuit of a suspect qualifies 
as an exigent circumstance regardless of the underlying offense.13  
Unfortunately, this holding increases the number of exceptions to the 
 
Amendment rights); Phyllis Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the 
Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1991) (arguing lack of coherent guidelines have 
widdled away the Fourth Amendment); Adina Schwartz, Homes as Folding Umbrellas: Two Recent 
Supreme Court Decisions on “Knock and Announce,” 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 545 (1998) (arguing 
recent attempts by the Supreme Court to define the home have resulted in considerable erosion of 
Fourth Amendment protections); but see Crystal Cunningham, Domestic Violence: I Don’t Need to 
Have Bruises to Feel Pain, A Worthy Exception to the Warrant Requirement, 28 PAC. L.J. 731 
(1997) (arguing exigent circumstance should be created to deal with domestic violence); cf. Steven 
W. Skinner, Note, Search and Seizure – Warrants - Police Officers Acting Pursuant to an Arrest 
Warrant May Pursue a Fleeing Suspect into a Private Residence and Forcibly Enter the Dwelling 
Without Knowing the Underlying Offense of the Warrant and Without First Knocking and 
Announcing Their Presence State v. Jones, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1736 (1996) (arguing hot 
pursuit doctrine is needed to prevent the hampering of police duties). 
 10. See Robert J. Driscoll, Unannounced Police Entries and Destruction of Evidence after 
Wilson v. Arkansas, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (1995) (discussing rash of police raids after 
no knock rule).  See also Matthew Hess, Comment, Good Cop-Bad Cop: Reassessing the Legal 
Remedies for Police Misconduct, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 149 (1993) (discussing civil and criminal 
remedies available for police misconduct). 
 11. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).  In discussing the rationale behind 
their decision the Court noted: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is 
not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable 
men draw from evidence.  Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. 
Id. 
 12. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“[S]earches outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”) 
(footnote omitted).  But see Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding Doctrine: How 
Illinois v. Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and 
Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1 (1991) (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s willingness to disregard settled doctrine while expanding exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment); Silas Wasserstrom, The Court’s Turn toward a General Reasonableness 
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119 (1989) (interpreting Supreme 
Court decisions in the Warren and Burger eras to have severely limited the power of the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 13. Id. 
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warrant rule without any corresponding justification.14  This Note will 
explore the Ohio Supreme Court’s reasoning and discuss potential 
problems created by failing to establish a buffer zone for interpretations 
of exigent circumstances to the constitutional warrant requirement.15  
Part II will discuss the history of the warrant requirement and its 
application to the states.16  Part III will present the facts and relevant 
procedural history17 of Middletown v. Flinchum.18  The Note will 
conclude by analyzing the court’s reasoning and exploring the possible 
consequences of its holding.19 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The History of the Warrant Requirement 
When interpreting20 Fourth Amendment protections21 courts have 
 
 14. Middletown v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002).  When officers are in hot 
pursuit of a suspect who flees into a residence, officers may enter that residence regardless of the 
underlying offense.  Id. 
 15. See Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1292 (1998) (arguing the court’s purpose is to act as a constitutional 
buffer, giving effect to the fundamental right of the governed in the face of the at times arbitrary 
powers of the legislature); Eulis Simien, Jr., The Interrelationship of the Scope of the Fourth 
Amendment and Standing to Object to Unreasonable Searches, 41 ARK. L. REV. 487, 524 (1988) 
(stating “the Constitution, which may not be changed in the ordinary process, was intended to be a 
buffer against the injustices caused by the swayable passions of the majority”). 
 16. See infra notes 20-84 and accompanying text. 
 17. See infra notes 85-128 and accompanying text. 
 18. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 331. 
 19. See infra notes 129-237 and accompanying text. 
 20. See Josephine R. Potuto, A Practitioner’s Primer to the Fourth Amendment, 70 NEB. L. 
REV. 412 (1991) (summarizing Fourth Amendment law); Scott Lewis, An Historical Review of the 
Fourth Amendment, 60 AUG WIS. B. BULL. 15 (1987) (discussing history and relevant case law of 
Fourth Amendment); Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and Order Originalism: 
A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago 
Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239 (2002) (providing a historical approach counter to that taken 
by the Supreme Court in Atwater v. Lago Vista). 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  The amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Id. For a basic analysis of Search and Seizure law see Understanding Search and Seizure Law, 
available at http://www.nolo.com/lawcenter/ency/article.cfm/objectID/DED24689-ADA8-4785-
887A0B4A19A694DE (last visited September 23, 2002) (providing a general summary of all Fourth 
Amendment law). See also Stacy E. Roberts, Note, Bond and Beyond: A Shift in the Understanding 
of What Constitutes a Fourth Amendment Search, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 457 (2002) (discussing how 
the Supreme Court has approached the concept of what is a search).  Christopher Slobogin, The 
4
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often relied on the state of common law during the framing of the 
Constitution.22  In the early 1700s colonists were subjected to countless 
searches based on little or even no suspicion.23  Some believe these 
unreasonable searches were a contributing factor in the American 
Revolution.24  Thus, it seems the framers were attempting to prevent 
unreasonable intrusions25 by requiring probable cause,26 particularity, 
and an oath prior to the issuance of a warrant.27 
 
World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1991) (presenting the question of how to 
regulate searches and seizures if the Fourth Amendment did not exist). 
 22. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 217-20 n.1 (1981) (discussing the power of 
constables at common law, but concluding “[t]he common law rules governing searches and arrests 
evolved in a society far simpler than ours is today . . . it would . . . be naive to assume that those 
actions a constable could take in an English or American village three centuries ago should 
necessarily govern what we, as a society, now regard as proper”); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 
927, 931 (1995) (recognizing that “[i]n evaluating the . . . [Fourth Amendment], we have looked to 
the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the common law 
at the time of the framing”).  Contra Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980) 
(discussing Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures should be 
interpreted by today’s norms). 
 23. See generally Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the 
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 483 (1995) (discussing the historical 
abuses framers sought to prevent with the Fourth Amendment); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the 
Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999) (arguing framers did not intend for a 
constitutional standard to regulate warrantless officers because they never perceived the warrantless 
officer as having the power to pose a significant threat to the security of person or house); Tracey 
Maclin, Another Grave Threat to Liberty, 24 N.L.J. 12 (2001) (stating “[i]n 1706, for example, 
colonial officials used such warrants to search every home in New Hampshire”). 
 24. Todd Witten, Note, Wilson v. Arkansas: Thirty Years After Ker the Supreme Court 
Addresses the Knock and Announce Issue, 29 AKRON L. REV. 447,447 (1996) (stating some 
scholars have argued the revolution was related to England’s lack of respect for the Colonists 
personal privacy) (citing WAYNE LAFAVE, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth 
Amendment § 1.1(a) (2d ed. 1987) (providing a summary of Fourth Amendment law)). 
 25. See, e.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 583-84.  The first draft of the Fourth Amendment included a 
clause limiting  the issuance of warrants, however the final copy included a second clause.  Id.  The 
first protected the citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures and the second clause required 
warrants to be particular and supported by probable cause.  Id.  Thus, the framers wanted 
protections from unreasonable searches and seizures, and wanted to prevent government abuse in 
the form of general warrants.  Id.  Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth 
Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 
TEMP. L. REV. 221 (1989) (arguing intent of framers was to protect against the unlimited and 
arbitrary exercise of power by the government), reprinted in 16 PACE L. REV. 97 (1996); cf. Surell 
Brady, Arrests Without Prosecution and the Fourth Amendment, 59 MD. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (2000) 
(discussing the drafting history of the Fourth Amendment). 
 26. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (stating “probable cause is a fluid concept 
turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts not readily, or even usefully, 
reduced to a neat set of legal rules”).  Thus, it seems that each factual situation must be analyzed by 
whether the officer or magistrate was objectively reasonable in believing probable cause existed.  
See Id. 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  See also Clancy, supra note 23, at 489-90 (discussing the 
reasons for the creation of the Fourth Amendment). 
5
Vaughn: Middletown v. Flinchum
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2004
VAUGHAN1.DOC 4/19/2004  10:25 AM 
514 AKRON LAW REVIEW [37:509 
The home has been afforded greater protection under the Fourth 
Amendment because it is the setting for the most intimate activities.28  
The significance of personal privacy in the home was recognized in 
early Seventeenth Century England.29  An English court forced the 
King’s men to announce their purpose and presence prior to entry.30  
This historical framework implies that the creation of the Fourth 
Amendment was an attempt to safeguard our right to privacy in the 
home.31 
B.  Balancing Test 
One must concede that when the threat to society outweighs32 the 
right to privacy, the warrant requirement may cause more harm than 
good.33  For instance, society has a strong interest in fighting the war on 
drugs and, without certain exceptions to the warrant rule, police are 
 
 28. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178-79 (1984) (stating sanctity of home has been 
embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic because it is the setting for the most 
intimate activities).  Alan W. Blackman, Comment, Warrantless Home Searches: The Road to 
Calabretta, 22 J. JUV. L. 64 (2002) (summarizing Fourth Amendment law on intrusions in the 
home). 
 29. Jennifer M. Goddard, Note, The Destruction of Evidence Exception to the Knock and 
Announce Rule: A Call for Protection of Fourth Amendment Rights, 75 B.U. L. REV. 449, 453-61 
(1995) (providing a historical analysis of the knock and announce rule). 
 30. See Semayne’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603).  In discussing the sheriff’s 
authority to execute a civil writ of attachment the court stated that “[i]n all cases where the King is 
party, the sheriff may break the house, either to arrest or do other execution of the King’s process, if 
he cannot otherwise enter.  But he ought first to signify the cause of his coming, and make request 
to open the doors.”  Id.  See also Goddard, supra note 29, at 453.  One author noted: 
[T]he rule of announcement was so firmly entrenched in England by the latter part of the 
eighteenth century, that the proposal by a noted jurist of no-knock powers for the police 
was seen as a radical innovation . . . . In the years immediately before 1791, then, search 
without announcement was not countenanced, despite repeated attempts to broaden 
search powers to include it. 
Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 144 (1970).  See also Tracey Maclin, Let 
Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History Unabridged, 
82 B.U. L. REV. 895, 912 n.68 (2002) (providing a history of the Fourth Amendment). 
 31. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984).  The court has stated that “[a] principal 
protection against unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed 
by the Fourth Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes of 
search or arrest.”  Id. 
 32. See Kevin Lantz, Search and Seizure: “The Princess and the ‘Rock,’” Minnesota 
Declines to Extend “Plain View” to “Plain Feel,” State v. Dickerson, 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 539 
(1993) (discussing Supreme Court’s use of the balancing test in Fourth Amendment cases). 
 33. See Amitai Etzioni, The Right to Privacy vs. the Common Good, USA TODAY MAG., 
September 2000, available at http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m1272/2664_129/65230204/ 
p1/article.jhtml (8/29/2002) (providing an analysis of the balancing test imposed on the Fourth 
Amendment). 
6
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subdued by their inability to secure evidence needed for a conviction.34  
Thus, our interest in public safety seemingly outweighs limited 
infractions on the individual right to privacy.35  Recognizing the framers 
could not have contemplated such issues, the Court has implemented a 
balancing test between society’s interest, exercised through the 
government, and the affected individual’s interest in privacy.36  When 
attempting to decipher the governmental interest, the Court focuses on 
the underlying crime because the applicable punishment impliedly 
shows society’s value on preventing the crime in question.37 
C.  The Warrant Requirement 
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable 
government searches and seizures.38  In Katz v. United States,39 the 
 
 34. Donald B. Allegro, Note, Police Tactics, Drug Trafficking, and Gang Violence: Why the 
No-Knock Warrant is an Idea Whose Time has Come, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 552, 553 (1989) 
(arguing “[in] light of the recent upsurge in narcotics and gang associated violence in many 
communities, it is appreciably more difficult for police serving narcotics search warrants to 
simultaneously seize admissible evidence and to ensure reasonable safety for themselves and 
others”). 
 35. See Douglas Holden Wigdor, What’s in a Word? A Comparative Analysis of Article I, §12 
of the New York State Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as 
Interpreted by the New York Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, 14 TOURO L. 
REV. 757 (1998) (discussing how conservative approaches to the Fourth Amendment prevent 
numerous felony convictions); George F. Will, Not Too Strict To Apply Justice, WASH. POST June 
17, 2001, at B7 (discussing use of thermo imaging devices as impermissible searches). 
 36. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999).  The Court created a balancing test 
to help deal with the rising crime problem.  Id.  This test recognizes the interest the government has 
in fighting crime, and attempts to preserve citizens’ privacy rights as provided by common law.  Id.  
The Court noted: 
In determining whether a particular governmental action violates this provision, we 
inquire first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the 
common law when the Amendment was framed. Where that inquiry yields no answer, 
we must evaluate the search or seizure under traditional standards of reasonableness by 
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy 
and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate 
governmental interests. 
Id.  (citations omitted). Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 737 (1992) (providing a step by step analysis for assessing Fourth Amendment 
Cases). 
 37. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984) (holding the nature of the underlying 
offense should be considered when determining whether exigent circumstances exist); cf. Payton v. 
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602 (1980) (limiting holding to felonies).  See also Jonathan T. Skrmetti, 
The Keys to the Castle: A New Standard for Warrantless Home Searches in United States v. 
Knights, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1201 (2001) (discussing the balancing test put forth by the 
Supreme Court). 
 38. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  “The right to be secure in their persons, houses papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”  Id.  Thomas K. Clancy, What Constitutes 
7
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Supreme Court determined that, absent exigent circumstances,40 all 
warrantless searches of the home are per se unreasonable.41  The Court 
reasoned that the warrant requirement serves to minimize the danger of 
needless intrusions.42  This rationale is based on the long held principle 
that physical entry into the home is the chief evil against which the 
Fourth Amendment is directed.43  The warrant provides restraint by 
forcing a police officer to present his estimate of probable cause to a 
judge or magistrate, and thus become bound by the precise limits 
imposed by the court exercised through the warrant.44 
 
an “Arrest” Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 129 (2003) 
(providing various definitions of the term arrest as used in Fourth Amendment search and seizure 
cases).  Evidence obtained in violation of one’s Fourth Amendment rights is excluded from trial.  
Miles Clark, The Exclusionary Rule, 90 GEO. L.J. 1264  (2002) (providing an in depth review of the 
exclusionary rule).  Roberto Iraola, New Detection Technologies and the Fourth Amendment, 47 
S.D. L. REV. 8 (2002) (discussing the application of the Fourth Amendment in today’s society). 
 39. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 40. 28 OH. JUR. Criminal Law § 2147 (3d ed. 2001).  Ohio has defined exigent circumstances 
excusing warrantless home entry to include: hot pursuit, immediate threat to arresting officers or the 
public, and immediate action needed to prevent destruction of evidence or escape.  Id.  See Dale 
Joseph Gilsinger, Annotation, When is Warrantless Entry of House or Other Building Justified 
Under “Hot Pursuit” Doctrine, A.L.R. (5th 2002), for a summary of other state approaches to the 
hot pursuit doctrine.  See also John F. Decker, Emergency Circumstances, Police Responses, and 
Fourth Amendment Restrictions, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 433 (1999) (focusing on the 
application of the emergency doctrine as an exigent circumstance); James A. Adams, Search and 
Seizure as Seen by Supreme Court Justices: Are they Serious or is this Just Judicial Humor?, 12 ST. 
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 413 (1993) (discussing drastic departure from the language used in the Katz 
case). 
 41. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).  The Court stated: 
‘Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate of the (Fourth) Amendment 
requires adherence to judicial processes,’ United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, and that 
searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. 
Id. 
 42. Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 n.24.  In discussing the purpose of the Fourth Amendment the 
Court noted: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is 
not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable 
men draw from evidence.  Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. 
Id.  (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)). 
 43. United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972), cited with approval 
in Payton, 445 U.S. at 585-86. 
 44. Katz, 389 U.S. at 356.  The Court found the agents’ search unreasonable because: 
They were not required, before commencing the search, to present their estimate of 
probable cause for detached scrutiny by a neutral magistrate.  They were not compelled, 
during the conduct of the search itself, to observe precise limits established in advance 
by a specific court order.  Nor were they directed, after the search had been completed, 
8
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The necessity of the warrant was demonstrated in Payton v. New 
York.45  In Payton, the Court struck down New York statutes authorizing 
police to make warrantless home entries in the course of routine felony 
arrests.46  Acknowledging the privacy interest a person has in his home, 
the Court rejected the argument that an arrest in a public place was 
indistinguishable from an arrest in the home.47 
In addition to a warrant, the Supreme Court requires law 
enforcement to knock and announce their presence prior to entering the 
home in order to satisfy the reasonable search requirement.48  Later, the 
Court held this requirement was a fundamental part of the Fourth 
Amendment and is applicable to states through the Due Process 
Clause.49  However, an exception has been recognized when police have 
reasonable suspicion to believe that adhering to the rule in a particular 
situation will be dangerous or will inhibit an effective investigation by 
 
to notify the authorizing magistrate in detail of all that had been seized. 
Id. 
 45. Payton, 445 U.S. at 587.  The Court distinguished between seizure of objects in public 
and plain view and those in the home.  Id.  See also Matthew A. Edwards, Posner’s Pragmatism 
and Payton Home Arrests, 77 WASH. L. REV. 299 (2002) (discussing Posner’s pragmatic 
application of social science to the Payton case).  See Matthew Bell, Warrantless Home Arrests and 
Police Liability Under Utah Law, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1131 (2002) (discussing potential liability 
for officers who rely on a Utah statute which misleads officers into believing they have the authority 
to make warrantless home arrests). 
 46. Payton, 445 U.S. at 577 n.6. The relevant portion of the New York law stated: 
A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person . . . When a felony has in fact 
been committed, and he has reasonable cause for believing the person to be arrested to 
have committed it . . . . [T]he officer may break open an outer or inner door or window 
of a building, if, after notice of his office and purpose, he be refused admittance. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 47. Id. at 587.  The Court reasoned that seizure in a public place is different because there is 
no expectation of privacy, however, individuals do have such expectation in their homes.  Id. 
 48. See  Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-44 (1963) (holding when evidence indicates 
occupants were in the process of committing a felony of possession of marijuana, arrest of 
occupants without warrants was valid and evidence seized was admissible); Miller v. United States, 
357 U.S. 301, 313-14 (1958) (holding evidence seized by officers was inadmissible when, prior to 
stating purpose and authority,  they forced their way into defendant’s home by breaking the chain 
lock); Charles Patrick Garcia, Note, The Knock and Announce Rule: A New Approach to the 
Destruction of Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 687 (1993) (providing a common law 
history of the knock and announce requirement and a history of relevant Supreme Court analysis). 
 49. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995).  This decision was based primarily on the 
longstanding history of the knock and announce rule in common law and its use in England.  Id. at 
931-37.  While establishing this principle was apart of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable 
requirement, the Court noted that law enforcement interests may play a part in establishing the 
reasonableness of an unannounced entry.  Id. at 935-37.  Thus, strict adherence to the knock and 
announce rule is subject to the needs of society and law enforcement.  Id.  This interpretative 
process was left to the lower courts.  Id. at 936.  For a further analysis of this case see Barnoski, 
supra note 9. 
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stimulating the destruction of evidence.50 
D.  Application of the Warrant Requirement to States 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution51 has 
been extended to the states through the Due Process Clause52 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.53  The Due Process Clause affords all citizens 
those fundamental rights that are basic to a free society.54  Malloy v. 
Hogan55 determined that fundamental rights are to be considered under 
the standards of federal law and not superseded by a less stringent state 
standard.56  Thus, states are free to provide additional protection to the 
 
 50. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997).  In reviewing the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court’s blanket exception to the knock and announce rule in drug cases the Court stated: 
Thus, the fact that felony drug investigations may frequently present circumstances 
warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing 
court the reasonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce in a particular 
case.  Instead, in each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to 
determine whether the facts and circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing 
with the knock-and-announce requirement. 
Id. at 394. The decision rested on the basis that the exception could easily be extended and was not 
necessary in all cases.  Id. 
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 52. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . . 
Id. 
 53. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-29 (1949).  The Court attempted to explain the concept 
of Due Process: 
Due process of law thus conveys neither formal nor fixed nor narrow requirements.  It is 
the compendious expression for all those rights, which the courts must enforce because 
they are basic to our free society . . . .  It is of the very nature of a free society to advance 
in its standards of what is deemed reasonable and right.  Representing as it does a living 
principle, due process is not confined within a permanent catalogue of what may at a 
given time be deemed the limits of the essentials of fundamental rights. 
Id. at 27. 
 54. Id. (holding the security of one’s privacy against arbitrary invasion by the police is basic 
to a free society, and is therefore enforceable against the states through Due Process). 
 55. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
 56. Id. at 10-11. 
[T]he prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures of the Fourth Amendment, and 
the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, are all to be enforced against 
the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect 
those personal rights against federal encroachment.  In the coerced confession cases, 
involving the policies of the privilege itself, there has been no suggestion that a 
confession might be considered coerced if used in a federal but not a state tribunal.  The 
Court thus has rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States 
10
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fundamental rights recognized in amendments to the U.S. Constitution,57 
but this level of protection can never fall below federal interpretations.58 
E.  Exigent Circumstances 
In Kirk v. Louisiana59 the Supreme Court made it clear that 
warrantless home intrusions are justified when a police officer has 
probable cause60 and exigent circumstances are present.  Exigent 
circumstances refer to those situations which require immediate 
intervention, thus excusing the government from following procedural 
requirements.61  The Court has long held that the hot pursuit doctrine 
satisfies the exigent circumstance exception.62 
Hot pursuit has been defined as an immediate pursuit from the 
location of a crime63 involving some element of chase.64  The length of 
the pursuit does not effect the determination of hot pursuit.65 
 
only a ‘watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights.’ 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 57. See generally Justice Charles W. Johnson, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 
1998 Update, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 337 (1998) (surveying current case law in Washington 
dealing with search and seizure); Lantz, supra note 32; Note, Search and Seizure, 14 TOURO L. 
REV. 1167 (1998) (discussing how New York courts interpret constitutional language when the 
federal and state statutes are similar); Robert M. Pitler, Independent State Search and Seizure 
Constitutionalism: the New York State Court of Appeals’ Quest for Principled Decision Making, 62 
BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1996) (discussing the difference between state and federal constitutional 
approaches to search and seizure); Wigdor, supra note 34. 
 58. Malloy, 378 U.S. at 10-11.  For a general discussion concerning various applications of 
Due Process, see YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 32-33 (10th ed. 2002). 
 59. Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 638 (2002) (overturning a Louisiana Court of Appeals 
decision that justified warrantless entry without establishing exigent circumstances). 
 60. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).  The Supreme Court has determined that probable 
cause to arrest depends “upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made . . . the facts and 
circumstances within [the arresting officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had 
committed or was committing an offense.”  Id.  See also State v. Flinchum, No. CA99-11-193, 2000 
WL 1843199, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist. Dec. 8, 2000) (unpublished). 
 61. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (Pocket ed. 1996), defining exigent circumstances as 
“[a] situation that demands unusual or immediate action and that may allow people to circumvent 
usual procedures, as when a neighbor breaks through a window of a burning house to save someone 
inside.”  Id. 
 62. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 218 (1981).  The Court overruled the Fifth 
Circuit’s finding that an arrest warrant was enough to enter and search a third party’s house, absent 
any showing of exigent circumstances.  Id. at 222-23. 
 63. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984). 
 64. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16 n.7 (1948) (“However, we find no element 
of hot pursuit in the arrest of one who was not in flight . . . .”), cited with approval in United States 
v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 43 n.3 (1976). 
 65. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest § 123 (2000). 
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F.  Supreme Court Applications of Exigent Circumstances 
1.  United States v. Santana 
The Supreme Court confronted the issue of warrantless home entry 
and hot pursuit in United States v. Santana.66  After a drug sting, police 
learned that Santana had possession of one hundred ten dollars in 
marked bills.67  Santana fled into her home after seeing police pull up to 
her house.68  Officers quickly apprehended Santana causing her to drop 
two bundles of cocaine.69  The Court determined the hot pursuit doctrine 
applied,70 and thus the failure to obtain a warrant did not prevent the 
 
 66. 427 U.S. 38, 39-44 (1976).  See Jack E. Call, The Constitutionality of Warrantless 
Doorway Arrests, 19 MISS. C. L. REV. 333, 333-34 (1999) (discussing the Supreme Court cases 
dealing with the entry way and Fourth Amendment analysis). 
 67. Santana, 427 U.S. at 39.  On August 16, 1974, Michael Gilletti, an undercover officer 
with the Philadelphia Narcotics Squad arranged a heroin “buy” with Patricia McCafferty.  Id.  
McCafferty told the undercover officer it would cost $115 and that they would obtain the heroin 
from Momma Santana.  Id.  “Gilletti notified his superiors of the impending transaction, recorded 
the serial numbers of $110 (Sic) in marked bills, and went to meet McCafferty at a prearranged 
location.”  Id.  McCafferty got into the undercover officer’s car and directed him to a home known 
as the Santanas’ residence.  Id. at 39-40.  McCafferty went in and returned with the heroin, the 
officer then showed his badge and asked who had the money.  Id. at 40.  McCafferty stated that 
Momma Santana had the money.  Id. 
 68. Santana, 427 U.S. at 40.  They saw Santana standing in the doorway of her home with a 
brown paper bag in her hand.  Id.  “They pulled up to within 15 feet of Santana and got out of their 
van, shouting ‘police,’ and displaying their identification.  As the officers approached, Santana 
retreated into the vestibule of her house.”  Id.  For a discussion of how the Fourth Amendment has 
been applied to the home, see Garnet M. Goins, Comment, Constitutional Law-Broadening the 
Scope of Qualified Immunity to Public Officials from §1983 Liability for Conducting Warrantless 
Entry into Individual’s Home, Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 803, 812 
(1999) (arguing the threshold of the home is the proper place to draw the line between a public 
place and a private home). 
 69. Santana, 427 U.S. at 40. 
 70. Id. at 42.  The Court noted that while the porch is private, cases analyzing the Fourth 
Amendment focus on one’s expectation of privacy.  Id. 
While it may be true that under the common law of property the threshold of one’s 
dwelling is “private,” as is the yard surrounding the house, it is nonetheless clear that 
under the cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment Santana was in a “public” place. She 
was not in an area where she had any expectation of privacy. “What a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own house or office, is not a subject of Fourth 
Amendment protection.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511, 19 
L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). She was not merely visible to the public but was as exposed to 
public view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been standing completely outside 
her house. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59, 44 S.Ct. 445, 446, 68 L.Ed. 898 
(1924). Thus, when the police, who concededly had probable cause to do so, sought to 
arrest her, they merely intended to perform a function which we have approved in 
Watson. The only remaining question is whether her act of retreating into her house 
could thwart an otherwise proper arrest. We hold that it could not. 
12
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admission of evidence found on Santana.71  The Court noted that, 
because of the possibility of destruction of evidence,72 the need to act 
quickly in this case is even more apparent than in Warden v. Hayden.73 
Justice White concurred in the holding, but felt the absence of force 
justified the entry of the home and not hot pursuit.74  Justice Stevens and 
Justice Stewart separately concurred in the holding, and focused 
primarily on the risk of evidence destruction.75  Justices Marshall and 
Brennan dissented on the basis that the hot pursuit was created by the 
officers and thus should not validate the entry.76 
2.  Welsh v. Wisconsin 
In Welsh, the defendant left his car on the side of a road after 
swerving out of control.77  After consulting a witness who informed 
 
Id. at 42.  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (stating that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his own house or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection”). 
 71. Santana, 427 U.S. at 43. “The fact that the pursuit here ended almost as soon as it began 
did not render it any the less a “hot pursuit” sufficient to justify the warrantless entry . . . [o]nce 
Santana saw the police, there was likewise a realistic expectation that any delay would result in 
destruction of evidence.”  Id.  See Richard J. Schaen, Note, Pretextual Arrests: The Ninth Circuit 
Invades the Home in United States v. Hudson, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1045 (1998).  The author noted 
that in this case officers did not have enough evidence to obtain a search warrant for the suspect, so 
they obtained an arrest warrant which resulted form an undercover cop selling a small amount of 
methamphetamine to the suspect.  Id. at 1045.  The officers knocked and announced with the 
warrant but did not wait for an answer, rather they quickly entered and found the evidence they 
were looking for.  Id. at 1046. The author viewed this as a pretextual arrest, which true purpose was 
to serve as a search warrant.  Id. at 1047. 
 72. Santana, 427 U.S. at 42-43. 
 73. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-300 (1967) (holding that where police are notified 
that an armed robber wearing light cap and dark jacket has entered house and clothing matching 
description is found in washing machine in house by officer without warrant before he knows a 
weapon has been found in another part of the house, even though clothing was “mere evidence” and 
had “evidential value only,” it is subject to seizure and admissible in the prosecution of the robber). 
 74. Id. at 43 (White, J., concurring). “It is not disputed here that the officers had probable 
cause to arrest Santana and to believe that she was in the house.  In these circumstances, a warrant 
was not required to enter the house to make the arrest, at least where entry by force was not 
required.”  Id.  (emphasis added). 
 75. Id. at 44-45. (Stevens, J., Stewart, J., concurring).  After placing McCafferty under arrest 
the police had enough information to obtain a warrant for Santana.  Id. at 44.  Therefore “their 
failure to obtain a warrant . . . was both (a) a justifiable police decision, and (b) even if not 
justifiable, harmless.  The decision was justified by the significant risk that the marked money 
would no longer be in Santana’s possession if the police waited until a warrant could be obtained.”  
Id. 
 76. Id. at 45-49 (Marshall, J., Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall conceded that exigent 
circumstances were present due to the close proximity of the arrest to the Santana home.  Id. at 47-
48.  However, this factor was in police control as they could have driven to a more remote location.  
Id. at 48. 
 77. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 742 (1984).  A passerby noticed a car swerve out of 
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officers that the driver appeared intoxicated, the police obtained 
defendant’s address from the vehicle’s registration.78  Without a warrant, 
the police gained entry and found the defendant lying naked on a bed.79  
In determining the entry was improper, the Court recognized that the 
nature of the underlying offense80 was an important factor in 
determining whether exigent circumstances were present.81  The Court 
rejected the imminent destruction of evidence argument and concluded 
that even if exigent circumstances were present, the traffic offense under 
Wisconsin law was a non-criminal civil forfeiture offense.82 
The Court concluded that entry into the home to arrest a person for 
a civil traffic offense was clearly prohibited by the Fourth Amendment 
because the State’s classification of the crime indicates a low interest in 
arrest.83  Furthermore, they noted that it would be difficult to conceive of 
a warrantless home arrest that would be reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment when the underlying offense is relatively minor.84 
 
control and eventually run off the road.  Id.  The witness pulled up behind the car to prevent it from 
leaving.  Id.  An additional passerby showed up and was instructed to call the police; however, the 
defendant left the scene before police arrived.  Id. 
 78. Id. The officer checked the motor vehicle registration to determine the defendant’s 
address.  Id.  The officer noted that the address was close to the scene and thus easily within 
walking distance.  Id. 
 79. Id.  at 743.  Police arrived at the defendant’s home around 9 p.m. and gained entry after 
defendant’s stepdaughter answered the door.  Id . The issue of whether there was consent to enter 
was never determined by the trial court because they found exigent circumstances.  Id. at 473 n.1.  
The issue was remanded, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court found exigent circumstances and the 
issue became moot.  Id.  Since no determination was made, the Supreme Court assumed no consent 
had been given for purposes of their decision.  Id. 
 80. See William A. Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth 
Amendment Equations- Warrantless Entries into Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 38 
U. KAN. L. REV. 439 (1990) (discussing application of the Welsh decision). 
 81. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753. (holding that “an important factor to be considered when 
determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest 
is being made”). 
 82. Id. at 754.  In response to the state’s exigency exception the court replied: 
Even assuming, however, that the underlying facts would support a finding of this 
exigent circumstance, mere similarity to other cases involving the imminent destruction 
of evidence is not sufficient.  The State of Wisconsin has chosen to classify the first 
offense for driving while intoxicated as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense . . . . Given 
this expression of the State’s interest, a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply 
because evidence of the petitioner’s blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while the 
police obtained a warrant. 
Id. 
 83. See id. at 754.  The Court reasoned that since the State of Wisconsin has classified D.U.I 
as a civil non-criminal offense, the State’s interest in arresting the defendant is low.  Id.  Thus, the 
fact that evidence may be destroyed during the time it took to get a warrant is not enough to obtain 
an exigent circumstance.  Id. 
 84. Id. at 753.  The Court listed several cases reaching differing decisions and noted that they 
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III.  STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A.  Facts 
On the morning of April 23, 1999, officers John Newlin and Wayne 
Birch observed a maroon car driven by Thomas E. Flinchum stopped at 
a traffic signal in Middletown, Ohio.85  As the light changed Flinchum 
spun his tires,86 causing the car to “fishtail” as it made a right turn.87  
Officer Burch attempted to follow Flinchum but was unable to locate 
Flinchum’s vehicle.88 
A few moments later the officers saw Flinchum in another 
intersection and again attempted to pursue the vehicle.89  As the officers 
closed in, Flinchum came to a near halt and turned his vehicle sharply 
down an alley.90  The officers, unable to make the sharp turn, were 
forced to drive around the block.91  Upon circling the block, the officers 
saw Flinchum standing near his car.92  The officers stopped their cruiser 
to speak with Flinchum.93  Upon seeing the officers, Flinchum ran 
towards the rear of his house while the officers yelled “Stop” and 
“Police.”94  Officer Birch jumped through bushes and ran toward the rear 
of the house.95  During this pursuit officer Birch heard the slamming of a 
screen door.96  Birch, after observing Flinchum through a window, 
entered the rear of the residence without permission and placed 
Flinchum under arrest.97 
 
did not approve of any one situation.  Id. at 752-53.  Recent Case, Criminal Procedure-Fourth 
Amendment-Search and Seizure-Tenth Circuit Applies Reasonable Suspicion Standard to Stops for 
Minor Traffic Infractions- United States v. Callarman, 116 HARV. L. REV. 697 (2002) (arguing the 
Tenth Circuit failed to consider the seriousness of the suspected offense). 
 85. State v. Flinchum, No. CA99-11-193, 2000 WL 1843199, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist. 
Dec. 18, 2000) (unpublished). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 334 (Ohio 2002) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  The dissent 
noted that upon viewing Flinchum’s acts the officers never activated their overhead lights.  Id. 
 90. Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *1. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id.; Liz Sidoti, Police Chased Man into His Home, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Dec. 20, 2001, 
available at http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2001/12/20/loc_police_chased_man.html (providing 
interviews with the key players in the Flinchum case). 
 94. Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *1. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id.; Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, Weekly Column, Hot Pursuit and Warrantless Entry (May 15, 
2002), available  at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Communications_Office/Justice_Pfeifer/ 
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B.  Procedural History 
1.  Trial Court 
Flinchum was charged with reckless driving, driving under the 
influence (DUI), and resisting arrest.98  His attorney filed a motion to 
suppress the evidence based on the officers’ warrantless entry.99  The 
trial court found there was no need for a warrant because the officers 
were in hot pursuit of Flinchum at the time of the intrusion.100  Flinchum 
was acquitted of resisting arrest, but was convicted for DUI and reckless 
operation.101 
2.  The Ohio Twelfth District Court of Appeals 
Flinchum appealed the trial court’s denial of the suppression 
motion.102  The appellate court recognized the limitations imposed by the 
Welsh Court,103 but felt the case turned on whether or not jail time could 
be imposed for the offense104 rather than its classification as a felony or 
misdemeanor.105  The court recognized that reckless operation does not 
 
2002/jp051502.asp [hereinafter Weekly Column].  The officer observed Flinchum through a kitchen 
window, standing about five feet from the door.  Id. 
 98. Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *1. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  The court granted the acquittal for resisting arrest pursuant to defendant’s Criminal 
Rule 29 motion.  Id. However, defendant received ninety days in jail and a suspended license for 
three years for the D.U.I and reckless driving charges.  Id. 
 102. Id. at * 2. Another issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in conducting a bench 
trial absent a jury waiver.  Id. at *5.  The court relied on Ohio Criminal Rule 23(A) to find failure to 
demand a jury in a petty offense case in effect waives ones right to a jury trial.  Id. at *5-6. 
 103. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984), construed in Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, 
at *2-4.  The Welsh Court hesitated in determining whether exigent circumstances are present when 
the underlying offense for which there is probable cause to arrest is relatively minor.  Id. at *2. 
 104. See State v. Dobbins, No. 94APC02-276, 1994 WL 521187, at *3 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. 
Sept. 22, 1994), cited with approval in Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *3.  The Flinchum 
appellate court refused to define all of Ohio’s misdemeanors as “minor offenses” to which the 
exigent circumstance exception would not apply, and further stated the determining factor is not 
classification but rather whether the offense is one that is punishable by jail.  Flinchum, 2000 WL 
1843199, at *3. 
 105. Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *3.  The court relied on State v. Rouse, 53 Ohio App. 3d 
48, 51 (Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 1988) and State v. Marlow, No. 17400, 1996 WL 84627, at *4 
(Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. Feb. 28, 1996) (unpublished), to hold that Welsh did not determine that a 
warrantless intrusion into a home was unjustified when the offense involved was a non-criminal 
civil forfeiture offense, not punishable by imprisonment, and where the arrest was not commenced 
in a public place.  Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *3-4. 
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satisfy their interpretation of the Welsh standard.106  However, the court 
felt the officer had probable cause to believe Flinchum was 
committing107 the crime of resisting arrest,108 a jailable offense.109  The 
court believed hot pursuit was present because Flinchum failed to obey 
the officers’ orders.110 
Upon finding the officer was in hot pursuit111 of a person suspected 
of a jailable offense, the court held that the police were permitted to 
follow the individual into his home to complete the lawful arrest.112  The 
appellate court subsequently petitioned the Ohio Supreme Court to 
decide whether the Fourth Amendment allows a warrantless entry into a 
home if police are in pursuit of a person they suspect has committed a 
misdemeanor.113 
3.  The Supreme Court of Ohio 
Recognizing the lack of uniformity among Ohio courts,114 the Ohio 
 
 106. Id. at *4.  The court cited Middletown, Ohio Codified Ordinance § 434.02, which defines 
reckless operation as a minor misdemeanor punishable by a fine not greater than $100, and to which 
no jail time may be imposed.  See MIDDLETOWN, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCE § 408.01(d). 
 107. Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *4.  The court felt Flichum’s actions of fleeing upon the 
officers’ arrival and disobeying their commands to stop gave the officers probable cause to believe 
Flinchum was resisting arrest. Id. 
 108. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.33.1(B) (Anderson 2000) (stating that “[n]o person shall 
operate a motor vehicle so as willfully to elude or flee a police officer after receiving a visible or 
audible signal from a police officer to bring the person’s motor vehicle to a stop”). 
 109. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  § 2929.21(B)(1) (Anderson 2000).  The crime of first-degree 
misdemeanor is punishable for up to six months in jail.  Id. 
 110. Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *4.  The court agreed with the trial court findings that 
the police were in hot pursuit.  Id. 
 111. Id.  The court relied on Santana to conclude hot pursuit had taken place.  “Where police 
have probable cause to arrest an individual in a public place and are in “hot pursuit” of that 
individual in the public place, the individual cannot defeat an otherwise lawful arrest by retreating 
into his home or some other private place.”  Id. (quoting United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-
43 (1976)). 
 112. Flinchum, 2000 WL 1843199, at *4.  The court stated: “Officer Birch had probable cause 
to believe appellant had committed a jailable offense, and the officer was in hot pursuit of appellant.  
Under such circumstances, police may be permitted to follow the individual into his home to 
complete the lawful arrest begun in public.”  Id. 
 113. See Weekly Column, supra note 97. 
 114. See the following cases which permit the exigent circumstance exception to apply to 
misdemeanor cases: State v. Marlow, No. 17400, 1996 WL 84627, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. 
Feb. 28, 1996) (interpreting Welsh as turning on imprisonment and not a felony); State v. Raszick, 
No. 93TRC11110, 1994 WL 728339 (Ohio Ct. App. 5th Dist. Dec. 29, 1994), appeal denied in, 649 
N.E.2d 278 (1995) (interpreting Santana as allowing entry when officers are in hot pursuit of a 
suspect who committed a misdemeanor in a public area); State v. Rouse, 557 N.E.2d 1227, 1229-30 
(Ohio Ct. App. 10th Dist. 1988) (officer’s entry into suspect’s home was proper, when suspect 
smelled of alcohol, slurred speech, refused to present his license and fled into his home). But see the 
following cases refusing to allow exigent circumstances to apply in misdemeanor cases: State v. 
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Supreme Court granted a motion to certify a conflict and requested the 
parties to brief the issue.115  The court recognized the need for a warrant 
prior to entering the home,116 but felt Santana117 and other jurisdictional 
treatment118 compelled them to extend the hot pursuit doctrine to 
misdemeanors.119  The court feared that adoption of such a rule would 
lead to the illusion that fleeing an officer is justified where the accused 
has only committed a misdemeanor.120  As a result, the court held that 
when an officer is in hot pursuit of a suspect who attempts to defeat the 
arrest by fleeing into his home, officers have the power to enter the 
home regardless of the underlying offense.121 
Justice Pfeifer disagreed with the majority and felt Santana was 
 
Davis, 726 N.E.2d 1092 (Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1999) (emphasizing the distinction between a 
felony and minor offenses and holding warrantless entry into a home to prevent destruction of 
evidence from an underage drinking party was invalid); State v. Scott, 733 N.E.2d 653, 656-57 
(Ohio Ct. App. 6th Dist. 1999) (holding that when underage persons were allegedly consuming 
alcohol, no violence was involved and no persons were armed, risk of escape was not present, and 
since resulting charges against defendant of contributing to delinquency of minor did not require 
proof that juveniles had certain alcohol content, the need to preserve evidence was not an exigent 
circumstance); Cleveland v. Shields, 663 N.E.2d 726, 728 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th Dist. 1995) (holding 
police officers’ continuous chase of suspected felon fell within hot pursuit exception, permitting 
officers to make warrantless entry into home to make arrest); State v. Banks, No. C-980774, 1999 
WL 632924, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 1st Dist. Aug. 20, 1999) (holding officers’ entry into a third 
party’s apartment to search for a suspect was unlawful especially considering the States failure to 
provide the underlying offense); State v. Trammel, No. 17196, 1999 WL 22884, at *8 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2d Dist. Jan. 22, 1999) (finding exigent circumstances were not present when officers entered 
suspect’s business property to give him a citation for disorderly conduct). 
 115. State v. Flinchum, 743 N.E.2d 402 (Ohio 2001) (unpublished table decision). 
 116. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2003).  The case noted that “physical entry 
of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”  Id. 
(quoting United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E.D. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972)). 
 117. Id.  “Although Santana deals with the issue of warrantless home arrests in the context of a 
felony suspect, we see no reason to differentiate appellant’s offense and give him a free pass merely 
because he was not charged with a more serious crime.”  Id. 
 118. Id.  The court relied on State v. Penas, 263 N.W.2d 835, syllabus (Neb. 1978) (holding 
that when a citizen has knowingly placed himself in a public place, and valid police action is 
commenced in that public place, the citizen cannot thwart police action by fleeing into a private 
place), and State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Minn. 1996) (holding a police officer in hot pursuit 
of a person suspected of the serious offense of driving under the influence of alcohol may make a 
warrantless entry into the suspect’s home in order to effectuate an arrest). 
 119. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 332 (holding “when officers, having identified themselves, are in 
hot pursuit of a suspect who flees to a house in order to avoid arrest, the police may enter without a 
warrant, regardless of whether the offense for which the suspect is being arrested is a 
misdemeanor”). 
 120. Id.  The court rejected Flinchum’s argument that officers were prevented from entering 
his home because probable cause and exigent circumstances were absent and because the underlying 
offense was merely a misdemeanor.  Id. 
 121. Id. 
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distinguishable from the case subjudice.122  In Santana, the court was 
faced with the possible destruction of evidence and commission of a 
felony, neither of which was present in Flinchum’s case.123  Therefore, 
Justice Pfeifer felt the Welsh opinion was controlling.124  Under Welsh, 
the government has the difficult task of rebutting a presumption of 
unreasonableness in the finding of exigent circumstances.125  Justice 
Pfeifer noted that the officers did not turn on their flashing lights or 
sirens, and Flinchum was already running towards his house prior to any 
remarks by the police.126 
Justice Pfeifer concluded by comparing the potential gains and 
losses from the decision.127  He determined the only benefit of the 
majority decision was that Ohio police may enter the homes of 
misdemeanants, but in addition to giving up a right that has been 
guarded for over two hundred years, he noted the court has placed 
homeowners and police in dangerous situations.128 
 
 122. Weekly Column, supra note 97.  In his dissent, Justice Pfeifer noted: 
[T]he police in Santana were faced with “a realistic expectation that any delay would 
result in destruction of evidence.”  They were also dealing with a felony.  The Supreme 
Court was willing to limit Fourth Amendment protections in a case where a serious 
crime was committed and where evidence of that crime was liable to be compromised.  
[In Flinchum], we are asked to weaken the Fourth Amendment in exchange for an arrest 
on a minor traffic offense where there was no threat of the destruction of evidence.  We 
are dealing in this case with a fundamental part of a fundamental right- the “physical 
entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment 
is directed.” 
Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 333 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.  Justice Pfeifer concluded: 
The Welsh court recognized exceptions for exigent circumstances, but emphasized that 
“exceptions to the warrant requirement are ‘few in number and carefully 
delineated’. . .and that police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an 
urgent need that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.”  In Welsh the court was 
quick to point out that the exception carved out by Santana concerns “hot pursuit of a 
fleeing felon.” 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 125. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980), cited with approval in Welsh v. 
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984). 
 126. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 334 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  Justice Pfeifer concluded the chase 
was more of a “luke warm amble” than a hot pursuit.  Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Rationale Behind Flinchum 
1.  The Severity of Punishment Identifies the Societal Interest 
The Ohio Supreme Court relied heavily on the idea that there is no 
reason to distinguish between crimes of varying severity.129  However, 
the level of punishment associated with a crime reflects society’s interest 
in preventing such crimes.130  Presumably, if society has a strong interest 
in preventing a crime they will pressure the state legislature to increase 
the penalty.131  When determining exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, 
courts must balance the government interest, as represented by society, 
against the private individual’s right to privacy.132  By finding no reason 
to differentiate between the severity of crimes, the Ohio Supreme Court 
has extinguished the balancing test, resulting in the right to privacy 
being permanently outweighed in the realm of hot persuit.133 
 
 129. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 332.  “Although Santana deals with the issue of warrantless 
home arrests in the context of a felony suspect, we see no reason to . . . give [appellant] a free pass 
merely because he was not charged with a more severe crime.”  Id.  Dawn Marie Johnson, The 
AEDPA and the IIRIA: Treating Misdemeanors as Felonies for Immigration Purposes, 27 J. LEGIS. 
477, 478-79 (2001) (providing a history of the misdemeanor-felony distinction).  Gabriel M. 
Helmer, Note, Strip Search and the Felony Detainee: A Case for Reasonable Suspicion, 81 B.U. L. 
REV. 239 (2001) (explaining application of the felony-misdemeanor distinction to strip search law). 
 130. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 333 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  The Court in Santana was dealing 
with a felony.  Id.  “The Supreme Court was willing to limit Fourth Amendment protections in a 
case where a serious crime was committed and where evidence of that crime was liable to be 
compromised.  Here, we are asked to weaken the Fourth Amendment in exchange for an arrest on a 
minor traffic offense where there was not threat of the destruction of evidence.”  Id.  See also 
William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and The Fourth Amendment, 58 MO. L. 
REV. 771, 802-04, 812 (1993) (discussing the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors). 
 131. See Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of “Public” Prosecutors in Historical 
Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1369 (2002) (“Elizabeth Rapaport argues that domestic 
homicides result in more lenient treatment for defendants than predatory crimes because modern 
American society assigns less moral outrage to wife-killing.”); Michael Vitiello, Punishment and 
Democracy: A Hard Look at Three Strikes’ Overblown Promises, 90 CAL. L. REV. 257, 288 (2002) 
(describing the three strikes laws as too harsh in comparison to the actual crime done to society); 
JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.06B(3), at 481 (2d ed. 1995) (stating 
felony murder rule “reflects society’s judgment that the commission of a felony resulting in death is 
more serious-and, therefore, deserves greater punishment than the commission of a felony not 
resulting in death”); Richard Brooks Holcomb, Note, Predicate Offenses for First Degree Felony 
Murder in Virginia, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 561, 568 n.39 (2000) (discussing Virginia’s felony 
murder rule). 
 132. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999) (comparing the government’s 
interest in law enforcement against the individual’s right to privacy). 
 133. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 332.  The court relied solely on the fact that Flinchum ran from 
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The U.S. Supreme Court in Welsh recognized there is a distinction 
to be found in the severity of crimes, and accordingly held that a court 
should be hesitant in finding exigent circumstances when the underlying 
crime is relatively minor.134  The Court stated that even if the 
circumstances had lent themselves to finding the necessity of immediate 
state action, Wisconsin chose to classify a DUI as a civil non-criminal 
offense for which no imprisonment is possible.135  Thus, if Wisconsin 
had provided a greater penalty for DUI, the chance of finding an exigent 
circumstance would have increased.136  The Court emphasized this idea 
by stating that this classification is the best indicator of the State’s 
interest in preventing this crime.137  By finding an exigency present 
 
police and provided no other basis for their decision.  Id.  See also Melissa Fernandez, The Fourth 
Amendment: Administrability Defeats Reasonableness in the Application of Arrest Law, 54 FLA. L. 
REV. 827 (2002) (discussing misdemeanor arrests); Schroeder, supra note 78 (discussing 
application of the Welsh decision); Raymond Hayes, Balancing Victims’ Rights and Probative 
Value with the Fourth Amendment Right to Security in the Exclusion of Unlawfully Seized Evidence, 
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 271 (2002) (presenting a balancing test that includes the victim’s rights).  
See also Kuras, supra note 6, at 1140 (providing balancing test that is measured by the degree of 
intrusion versus states need to ensure public safety). 
 134. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1984).  The Supreme Court stated that 
“exceptions to the warrant requirements are ‘few in number and carefully delineated’ and that the 
police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that might justify 
warrantless searches or arrests.”  Id. (citations omitted).  The Court then cited Santana in which the 
parenthetical stated “hot pursuit of a fleeing felon.”  Id. at 750.  Therefore, there may be an 
argument over whether Santana is limited to hot pursuit of felons. 
 135. Id. (stating “[o]ur hesitation in finding exigent circumstances, especially when warrantless 
arrests in the home are at issue, is particularly appropriate when the underlying offense for which 
there is probable cause to arrests is relatively minor”).  It is puzzling how a court can say hot 
pursuit, an exigency, constitutes a per se exception to the warrant requirement. William W. 
Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of the “Per Se” Rule: Justice Stewart’s Struggle to 
Preserve the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant Clause, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013 (1994) (presenting 
the arguments focusing on a literal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment). See supra notes 77-84 
and accompanying text. 
 136. See Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home is His Castle?”: Reflections on the Home, the 
Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 175 (2002) (explaining the development of search and seizure law in regard to the 
home from 1870 through 1920). In United States v. Santana, the Court allowed entry because Mrs. 
Santana was carrying drugs, and upon viewing police, was likely to destroy evidence of a potential 
felony drug crime.  Santana, 427 U.S. at 43 (stating “[o]nce Santana saw the police, there was 
likewise a realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruction of evidence”).  Such 
examples seem rare when viewed in the arena of misdemeanors. 
 137. Welsh, 466 U.S. at 754 (commenting that Wisconsin had chosen to classify DUI as a non-
criminal, civil forfeiture case and this classification was the best indicator of a State’s interest in 
preventing a crime).  The Supreme Court has stated that there must be a compelling necessity for 
immediate action to prevent the potential harm that a delay in obtaining a warrant could present, 
however such compelling necessities are unlikely in misdemeanor cases.  Warden v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).  See also Robert S. Leming, Teaching About the Fourth Amendment’s 
Protection Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, available at http://www.ed.gov/ 
databases/ERIC_Digests/ed363526.html (last updated May 1993) (providing an analysis of 
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during all hot pursuits regardless of the offense, the Ohio Supreme Court 
rejects the societal interest as well as some of the basic protections 
provided by the U.S. Supreme Court.138 
The Ohio Twelfth District Court of Appeals properly differentiated 
Welsh on the basis of whether the underlying offense is a jailable or non-
jailable offense.139  It should be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court 
rejected the jailable/non-jailable distinction in the context of warrantless 
misdemeanor arrests140 in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.141  The Court 
was concerned that the jailable distinction rests on factors not readily 
apparent, such as whether the suspect has previously been convicted or 
 
Supreme Court decisions concerning unreasonable searches and seizures).  In Warden, the court 
allowed police to enter a home after they had probable cause to believe that an armed robber had 
entered a home, thus the potential for imminent harm was great.  Warden, 387 U.S. at 298 
(recognizing the right of police to make a warrantless entry when they have probable cause to 
believe an armed robber had entered a house a few minutes before). 
 138. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753.  The Court specifically held: 
[A]n important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is 
the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made.  Moreover, 
although no exigency is created simply because there is probable cause to believe that a 
serious crime has been committed, see Payton, application of the exigent- circumstances 
exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned when there is 
probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at issue in this case, 
has been committed. 
Id. 
 139. State v. Flinchum, No. CA99-11-193, 2000 WL 1843199, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 12th Dist. 
Dec. 18, 2000) (unpublished).  The court determined that, 
consistent with Welsh, the operative analysis for determining whether the underlying 
offense is a “minor” one for purposes of an officer’s warrantless entry into a home is not 
whether the offense is a felony or a misdemeanor; the determinative factor is whether the 
offense is one that is punishable by jail or imprisonment. 
Id.  But see Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist Court, Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive 
Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1337-38 (2002) (the author argues that the amount 
of protection afforded will decrease rather than increase with the seriousness of the crime, but one 
would assume that we need the greatest protection when the punishment is greatest). 
 140. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 348-49 (2001).  The Court felt it would be 
too difficult to apply such a distinction when the officer was attempting to make an arrest.  Id.  See 
Patrick S. Yatchak, Note, Breaching the Peace: The Trivialization of the Fourth Amendment 
Reasonableness Standard in the Wake of Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 329 
(2002) (providing various crimes for which an individual can be arrested and taken to jail, including 
eating a ham sandwich on the subway in violation of a county ordinance in New York). 
 141. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 318. Texas law made it a misdemeanor violation for not wearing a 
seat belt, which allowed warrantless arrest for anyone in violation.  Id. at 323.  An officer pulled 
Atwater over for violating the law and “verbally berated her, handcuffed her, placed her in his squad 
car, and drove her to the local police station, where she was made to remove her shoes, jewelry, and 
eyeglasses, and empty her pockets.”  Id. at 324.  Her mug shot was taken and she was placed in a 
cell for almost an hour.  Id.  She pleaded no contest to the seatbelt misdemeanors and paid a $50 
fine.  Id.  The Court stated that “the physical incidents of arrest were merely gratuitous humiliations 
imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment.”  Id. at 346-47. 
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the amount of marijuana in a bag.142  However, asking whether the 
officer had a reasonable belief that the suspect had committed a jailable 
offense would easily counter such arguments.143  Furthermore, Atwater 
dealt with a warrantless arrest in a public place, which does not require 
as much protection as warrantless home intrusions.144 
2.  Jurisdictional Support 
The Ohio Supreme Court relied on two cases, Minnesota v. Paul 
and Nebraska v. Penas, in upholding the warrantless entry.145  In 
Minnesota v. Paul, a police officer was in an auto parts store when the 
defendant put his arm around the officer and began to talk to him.146  
The officer smelled alcohol on the defendant but never questioned him.  
The officer then saw the defendant climb into a truck.147  Deciding to 
follow him, the officer observed defendant roll through a stop sign and 
fishtail into a turn.148  At this point the officer activated the overhead 
lights and pursued defendant for several miles on the highway and 
eventually to defendant’s residence.149 The officer knocked on the front 
door and spoke with the defendant’s wife who insisted her husband was 
 
 142. Atwater, 532 U.S. at 348-49.  The Court felt it was impractical for an officer to determine 
if it was the suspect’s first arrest.  Id. at 348.  They also felt that it was impossible to determine if 
the amount of marijuana in a bag was an ounce or less than an ounce.  Id. at 348-49.  Thus, the 
standard would be too difficult to apply and require a case by case application.  Id. 
 143. Interview with J. Dean Carro, Professor of Law at the University of Akron School of Law 
in Akron, Ohio (February, 4, 2003) (discussing the potential application of the jailable standard in 
relation to Atwater, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)).  It seems a court could easily apply this standard to 
determine if the amount of marijuana in a bag could reasonably be viewed as a jailable offense.  Id.  
I would also advocate that it is unreasonable for an officer to assume an individual had committed a 
previous offense, absent actual knowledge.  Id. 
 144. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 323-27.  Also, Atwater involved a vehicle to which the Court has 
been unwilling to extend an amount of privacy equal to that of a home.  California v. Carney, 471 
U.S. 386, 391 (1985) (“[L]ess rigorous warrant requirements govern because the expectation of 
privacy with respect to one’s automobile is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or 
office.”); The Court has generally found that “law enforcement officials [are granted] greater 
latitude in exercising their duties in public places.”  Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 565 (1999).  
The Court also found that a suspect is not in custody for mere questioning on a public street because 
a motorist is in view of the public thus decreasing any chance of police misconduct.  Berkemer v. 
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438 (1984).  Because we have a greater interest in privacy in the home, a 
court should be more willing to accept this argument as it outweighs the associated uncertainty. 
 145. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002).  “Similar conclusions have already 
been reached in other jurisdictions,” in Nebraska and Minnesota.  Id. 
 146. State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn. 1996). 
 147. Id.  The officer walked across the street to a gas station, after four or five minutes he saw 
the defendant walk out of the auto parts store and climb into his pickup truck.  Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 262-63. 
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not home.150  However, the officer entered the home and eventually 
found the defendant emerging from the basement.151 
In Paul, the court distinguished Welsh primarily on the ground that 
driving under the influence was a criminal offense rather than a civil 
forfeiture offense; however, in Flinchum the Welsh holding was 
completely ignored.152  Therefore, Paul does not support the proposition 
that hot pursuit is justified regardless of the underlying offense.153 
In Nebraska v. Penas an officer who witnessed a van veer into 
oncoming traffic and make a U-turn decided to follow the vehicle.154  
After reaching the defendant’s home the officer ordered the defendant to 
stop; however, the defendant proceeded into the house.155  The officer 
followed, but decided to radio for backup out of concern for his 
safety.156  Another officer arrived and they entered the home to arrest the 
defendant.157  The court relied upon Santana in upholding the arrest; 
however, this case was decided six years before the Welsh opinion.158  In 
 
 150. Id. at 263.  Upon reaching the house the defendant ran out of his truck towards the garage.  
Id.  The officer reached the door but it was locked.  After asking for the door to be opened the 
officer went around to the front of the house.  Id.  Defendant’s wife answered the front door and 
stated the defendant was not home. Id.  The officer asked the wife to look inside the house to make 
sure he was not home.  Id.  Compare Paul, 548 N.W.2d at 263 (knocking on the door and asking, 
“Sir, come on out, answer the door, come out and talk to me”) with State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 
330, 331 (2002) (stating “[w]ithout appellant’s permission, Officer Birch entered the home and 
arrested him”); State v. Stuber, No. 1-02-20, 2002 WL 31618993, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. 
Nov. 21, 2002) (forcing open a locked door). 
 151. Paul, 548 N.W.2d at 263.  The officer looked in the kitchen and garage but was unable to 
find the defendant.  Id.  The officer began to question defendant’s wife when the defendant emerged 
from the basement.  Id. 
 152. Id. at 266.  The court differentiated Welsh on three grounds: “(1) the officer was in hot 
pursuit; (2) there was a need to preserve evidence of the defendant’s blood alcohol level; and (3) the 
ordinance or statute under which the defendant was arrested provided for criminal penalties and not 
merely noncriminal civil forfeitures.”  Id.  Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 330 (failing to cite the Welsh 
opinion).  It should be noted that the first two grounds appear completely illusory as the Welsh 
Court stated that “a warrantless home arrest cannot be upheld simply because evidence of the 
petitioner’s blood-alcohol level might have dissipated while the police obtained a warrant.”  Welsh 
v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 754 (1984).  The Court further stated that “[e]ven assuming, however, 
that the underlying facts would support a finding of  . . . [hot pursuit], mere similarity to other cases 
involving the imminent destruction of evidence is not sufficient . . . [because] [t]he State of 
Wisconsin has chosen to classify . . . [D.U.I.] . . . as a noncriminal, civil forfeiture offense for which 
no imprisonment is possible.”  Id. 
 153. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 332.  The court clearly evidenced they found no distinction 
between felonies and misdemeanors by saying: “[W]e see no reason to differentiate appellant’s 
offense and give him a free pass merely because he was not charged with a more serious crime.”  Id. 
 154. State v. Penas, 263 N.W.2d 835, 836 (Neb. 1978). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id at 837. 
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fact, after deciding this case Nebraska courts have interpreted Welsh as 
turning on whether the underlying crime is punishable by jail.159  
Clearly, the cases cited by the Ohio Supreme Court do not support the 
contention that the underlying offense is irrelevant in determining an 
exigency.160 
It seems the majority of jurisdictions have interpreted Welsh as 
prohibiting warrantless home intrusions when the offense is a non-
jailable.161  Relatively few courts have been willing to follow Flinchum 
and hold that hot pursuit alone creates an exigency to enter the home 
regardless of the underlying offense.162 
B.  Balancing Test: Governmental Interest 
1.  Bright Line Rules 
The Supreme Court of Ohio has created a bright line rule that 
allows officers to enter a home during the hot pursuit of any offense.163  
 
 159. State v. Beeken, 585 N.W.2d 865 (Neb. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Gerstner, No. A-91-1256, 
1993 WL 44493, at *6 (Neb. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 1993) (finding that the Supreme Court of Nebraska 
requires a serious offense to the finding of an exigency) (quoting State v. West, 388 N.W.2d 823, 
830 (Neb. 1986)). 
 160. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002) (opining “we see no reason to 
differentiate appellant’s offense and give him a free pass merely because he was not charged with a 
more serious crime”). 
 161. Dyer v. State, 680 So.2d 612, 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (distinguishing on whether 
jail is possible); Goines v. James, 433 S.E.2d 572, 578 (W.Va. 1993) (focusing on whether the 
underlying offense is punishable by jail); State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763, 773 (Iowa 2001) 
(distinguishing Welsh on the basis that Wisconsin had classified DUI as a civil non-forfeiture 
offense for which no jail was possible); State v. Blake, 468 N.E.2d 548, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) 
(adopting Justice White’s dissent in Welsh and focusing on the severity of the underlying offense); 
Hamrick v. State, 401 S.E.2d 25, 26-27 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that when officers pursued a 
yellow motorcycle and then later found it leaning against a house, they could not enter the residence 
even though they were in hot pursuit because there was no danger of destruction of evidence, and 
the suspect had only committed a misdemeanor); State v. Mikkelson, 647 N.W.2d 421, 424-25 
(Wisc. Ct. App. 2002) (finding no exigent circumstances present when officers were in hot pursuit 
of a suspect for obstructing an officer which is a misdemeanor); Waugh v. State, 51 S.W.3d 714, 
718 n.3 (Texas Ct. App. 2001) (distinguishing on basis of whether jail is possible). 
 162. People v. Lloyd, 265 Cal. Rptr. 422, 425 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding it does not matter 
whether the underlying offense is a misdemeanor or a felony); State v. Ramirez, 814 P.2d 1131, 
1134-35 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (finding hot pursuit is enough to create an exigency and it does not 
matter what is the underlying offense). 
 163. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 332.  By creating a bright line rule for hot pursuit, the court has 
sanctioned entrance to the home for any crime, regardless of the nature of the offense, weakening 
the already strained warrant requirement.  Id. at 334 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  Jennifer Ison Cooke, 
Discretionary Warrantless Searches and Seizures and the Fourth Amendment: A Need for Clearer 
Guidelines, 53 S.C. L. REV. 641 (2002) (discussing contradictions in Supreme Court cases dealing 
with warrantless arrests).  Rachael M. Dockery, Note, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista A Simple, 
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The United States Supreme Court has shown a preference for bright line 
rules in some situations, primarily because they clarify the duties of law 
enforcement and allow easier application of decisions.164  However, the 
Court has been hesitant in applying such rules when the costs exceed 
these potential benefits.165 
In Richards v. Wisconsin, the Court conceded that felony drug 
investigations frequently involve violent circumstances and the risk of 
evidence destruction.166  In rejecting a bright line rule allowing no-knock 
entries in felony drug arrests, the Court focused on two factors.167  First, 
this bright line rule is based on an overgeneralization, that is while some 
drug investigations pose great danger, others vary considerably as to the 
degree of harm associated.168  Second, the exceptions for one category 
can easily be applied and expanded to other categories.169 
As we consider the bright line rule given by the Ohio Supreme 
Court we see that a great overgeneralization has occurred.170  The court 
has decided that all fleeing misdemeanants are of such a danger that 
Ohio police may forcefully enter homes.171  If the Supreme Court was 
 
Bright-Line Holding Results in Future Fourth Amendment Confusion, 55 ARK. L. REV. 577 (2002) 
(discussing the Atwater v. City of Lago Vista case and detailing the problems with the bright line 
holding and how it compares to the balancing test). 
 164. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 576-79 (1991) (finding the old Chadwick-Sanders 
rule too confusing for police to apply); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (“A single, 
familiar standard is essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to 
reflect on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances they 
confront.”) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)). 
 165. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 (1997) (rejecting Wisconsin’s per se rule for no 
knock entries during routine felony arrests because not all felony arrests will have the possibility of 
destruction of evidence or impair the safety of officers). 
 166. Richards, 520 U.S. at 392 (recognizing that the knock-and-announce requirement could 
give way “under circumstances presenting a threat of physical violence,” or “where police officers 
have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were given”) 
(quoting Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 936 (1995)). 
 167. Richards, 520 U.S. at 392 (creating exceptions to the knock-and–announce rule based on 
the culture surrounding a general category of criminal behavior presents at least two serious 
concerns).  See Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 53 
(2003) (arguing that police should study crime patterns in order to learn what creates crime and 
focus on the elimination of such problems). 
 168. Richards, 520 U.S. at 393 (“First, the exception contains considerable overgeneralization.  
For example, while drug investigation frequently does pose special risks to officer safety and the 
preservation of evidence, not every drug investigation will pose these risks to a substantial 
degree.”). 
 169. Id. at 393-94 (stating that “[a] second difficulty with permitting a criminal-category 
exception to the knock-and announce requirement is that the reasons for creating an exception in 
one category can, relatively easily, be applied to others”). 
 170. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 334 (Ohio 2002) (Pfeifer, J., dissenting) (arguing the 
only thing gained by this ruling is allowing the police to enter the households of tire spinners). 
 171. Id. at 332 (holding warrants are not required for fleeing suspect regardless of whether the 
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unwilling to assume that all felony drug arrests are surrounded by 
dangerous circumstances, then it seems implausible to assume, as 
Flinchum does, that all fleeing misdemeanants require extreme 
precautions.172  The second concern is that at some point the exceptions 
to the warrant requirement will extinguish its existence.173  It is 
important to note that the Court in Richards was unwilling to extend the 
law to allow no-knock entries when police already have a warrant,174 
where as the holding in Flinchum creates a bright line rule for officers 
who do not have a warrant.175  As the dissent in Flinchum suggests, the 
benefit received by such a bright line rule is minor when compared to 
the possible consequences.176 
2.  Swifter Law Enforcement 
It seems the major benefit of the ruling is that officers save valuable 
time often spent attempting to obtain a warrant.177  However, this benefit 
 
offense being committed was a misdemeanor). 
 172. See supra notes 166-167 and accompanying text. 
 173. Brady, supra note 25, at 21 (discussing the consequences of the warrant exceptions).  
Consequences of laws such as the one created in Flinchum include: exceptions to the warrant rule 
become the rule, increases in arrests due to less procedural grounds for a warrant, and broad police 
authority coupled with operational stresses in the court system removes the buffer between the 
government and individuals which undermines the intent of the framers.  Id.; Bookspan, supra note 
9 (arguing lack of coherent guidelines has rendered the Fourth Amendment useless); Charles W. 
Chotvacs, The Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement: Constitutional Protection or Legal 
Fiction? Noted Exceptions Recognized by the Tenth Circuit, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 331 (2002) 
(addressing the large number of current exceptions to the warrant rule as decided in the U.S. Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals); Garcia, supra note 48, at 687 (arguing against blanket or particularity 
approaches and proposing a reasonable alternative approach that resolves contradictory public 
policy goals of effective law enforcement and protection of individualized liberty). 
 174. Richards, 520 U.S. at 388.  Police in Richards had already obtained a warrant, thus a 
neutral detached magistrate had already made a decision.  Id.  However, this was still not enough 
protection from unreasonable searches to allow this bright line rule.  See Id. at 395-96. 
 175. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d at 332. 
 176. Id. at 334 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  Ohio police are now able to enter the homes of “tire 
spinners.”  Id. 
 177. Id. at 332 (holding “when officers, having identified themselves, are in hot pursuit of a 
suspect who flees to a house in order to avoid arrest, the police may enter without a warrant, 
regardless of whether the offense for which the suspect is being arrested is a misdemeanor”).  See 
Christine A. Haberle, Note, Search and Seizure—Stop and Frisk—Evidence Seized Incident to an 
Arrest that is Based Upon a Police Officer’s Computer Record that Failed to Indicate that the 
Arrest Warrant had been Quashed, due to an Error Committed by Court Personnel, is Within the 
Scope of the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule Arizona v. Evans, 26 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 866 (1996) (arguing for liberal interpretations of Fourth Amendment exceptions.  Specifically, 
strict application of exclusionary rule is improper because it will set the guilty free and it provides 
no impermissible burden on citizens rights).  See Los Angeles Police Department Board of Inquiry 
into the Rampart Area Corruption Incident, Public Report 67 (2000) [hereinafter Rampart Incident] 
(finding L.A. anti-gang officers routinely entered homes without a warrant because they believed 
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is limited when we consider that officers have the right to wait outside 
and secure the premises until a warrant is issued.178  Thus, the suspect is 
unlikely to escape.179  Also, this argument ignores the fact that warrants 
can be obtained much faster with cell phones, fax machines, and various 
other means.  Therefore, the time argument should be less persuasive 
today than it may have been one hundred years ago.180 
Perhaps the timing concern reflects the idea that evidence may be 
destroyed while an officer is awaiting a warrant, but the officer must 
know evidence exists to create an exigency.181  Furthermore, the 
Richards Court was unwilling to presume that felony drug arrests will 
always be coupled with the chance that evidence will be destroyed.  This 
should preclude any argument that destruction of evidence in non-
jailable offenses is of great concern.182 
 
getting a warrant takes too long), cited in David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1129, 1249 n.60 (2002). 
 178. United States v. Grummel, 542 F.2d 789, 791 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding it was proper to 
secure the premises to prevent destruction of evidence until a warrant could be obtained); Segura v. 
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 798 (1984) (allowing officers to secure the premises from the inside or 
the outside). 
 179. David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
1739 (2000) (arguing recent historical approach of deciding whether a search is reasonable departs 
from the Warren and Burger decisions which relied on the general aims of the Fourth Amendment). 
See Rampart Incident supra note 177. 
 180. John Michael Harlow, Note, California v. Acevedo: The Ominous March of a Loyal Foot 
Soldier, 52 LA. L. REV. 1205, 1242-43 (1992).  Harlow argues that: 
Many police departments can phone in warrant requests, and developing 
communications technology will only quicken the warrant process. Warrants can even be 
issued within one hour.  Furthermore, those individuals who value their time more than 
their privacy interest in a container may waive the warrant requirement and consent to an 
immediate search. Of course, for those who do not consent, the police will be required to 
spend some time to satisfy the warrant requirement. But, the police cannot say that their 
time is too valuable to recognize a citizen’s constitutional right to a magistrate’s 
approval of the search. 
Id. 
 181. Hamrick v. State, 401 S.E.2d 25, 27 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990) (refusing to find exigent 
circumstances because the officer could not have known that driver of a motorcycle was drunk so 
the fact that it was later discovered cannot be a part of the assessment of whether exigent 
circumstances were present). 
 182. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 (1997).  The Court stated that not every felony 
drug arrest will present the threat of destruction of evidence.  Id. 
For example, a search could be conducted at a time when the only individuals present in 
a residence have no connection with the drug activity and thus will be unlikely to 
threaten officers or destroy evidence.  Or the police could know that the drugs being 
searched for were of a type or in a location that made them impossible to destroy 
quickly.  In those situations, the asserted governmental interests in preserving evidence 
and maintaining safety may not outweigh the individual privacy interest . . . . 
Id.  Barbara C. Salken, Balancing Exigency and Privacy in Warrantless Searches to Prevent 
Destruction of Evidence: The Need for a Rule, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 283 (1988) reprinted in 16 PACE 
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3.  Prevents Incentives to Flee 
Another benefit of the bright line rule is that it removes the 
incentive to flee from officers; however, the incentive is the possibility 
of escape, not the additional time spent in the home while a warrant is 
procured.183 
A Minnesota court argued that applying Welsh too strictly would 
lead to the following problem: a DUI is generally a misdemeanor, thus if 
a suspect knows he is protected in his home until a warrant is obtained 
he will likely attempt to flee.184  During this time, a crafty suspect could 
drink alcohol rendering the results of any Breathalyzer unreliable.185  
Certainly, we do not want to provide incentive to engage in high speed 
chases.186  However, this argument does not justify extending hot pursuit 
to all crimes, but rather only to offenses punishable by jail.  Thus, there 
 
L. REV. 37 (1997).  The author described the three types of procedures used by federal courts to 
determine whether destruction of evidence satisfies the exigency requirement: 
(1) the “examine-avoid” approach, exemplified by courts that critically evaluate the 
police officer’s assertion that an emergency exists and also require that officers avoid 
warrantless action when possible; (2) the “uncritical” approach, illustrated by courts that 
accept at face value the police officer’s assertion that an emergency exists and do not 
affirmatively require that police avoid warrantless action although possible; and (3) the 
“examine-only” approach employed by courts that critically evaluate the police officer’s 
assertion that an emergency exists, but do not require that officers avoid the need for 
warrantless action although possible. 
Id. at 43. 
 183. See infra notes 203-10 and accompanying text. 
 184. State v. Paul, 548 N.W.2d 260, 268 (Minn. 1996).  In explaining the possible 
consequences of a per se rule preventing hot pursuit of misdemeanors the court stated: 
The Fourth Amendment simply cannot be stretched nor can public safety be ensured by a 
bright-line felony rule which would encourage drunk drivers to elude the police by 
racing through the streets to the sanctuary of their homes in order to “freeze” a hot 
pursuit or to otherwise evade a lawful arrest. 
Id. 
 185. Id. at 267.  The court noted that 
Had Officer Gunderson not immediately entered Paul’s home, Paul’s blood alcohol level 
might have dissipated while a warrant was being obtained, or Paul might have drunk 
more alcohol, making a chemical test unreliable. 
Id. (citing State v. Storvick, 428 N.W.2d 55, 58 (Minn. 1988), where the “defendant informed 
arresting officers that ‘I drank after I got home’ in an attempt to thwart the state’s attempt to collect 
evidence against him”). 
 186. Paul, 548 N.W.2d at 268.  The court further reasoned: 
Adopting a bright- line rule based on the legislature’s classification of conduct as a 
misdemeanor would also sweep away any possibility that warrantless home arrests 
would be justified for those misdemeanors in which the underlying conduct is serious, or 
when the underlying offense is minor, but subsequent activity by the perpetrator during 
his flight from the police elevates the situation to a serious one. 
Id. 
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seems to be little support for Flinchum’s broad holding.187 
C.  Balancing Test: Privacy Interest 
The home has long been afforded greater protection as it is the 
place for the most intimate details of our lives.188  The home is our only 
refuge from the outside world.  It is our safe haven and the center of our 
privacy interests.189  Accordingly, this has been recognized at various 
times by the Supreme Court.190 
However, when courts allow warrantless home intrusions the 
chances of our privacy being invaded are greater.191  This results from 
circumventing the neutral magistrate, who serves to prevent 
unreasonable intrusions on our privacy.192  It is clear that increasing the 
 
 187. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002) (holding hot pursuit will justify a 
warrantless entry regardless of the underlying offense).  See supra notes 129-44 and accompanying 
text discussing how the Ohio Supreme Court should have considered the severity of punishment in 
determining exigent circumstances. 
 188. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.  See also Rich Jefferson, Federal Judge 
Delivers Major Opinion Supporting Sanctity of Family Home, Home School Legal Defense 
Association, available at http://www.hslda.org/docs/nes/hslda/199701080.asp (Jan. 8, 1997) 
(discussing improper searches with regard to reports of child abuse). 
 189. Hafetz, supra note 136 (providing a review of the court’s treatment of the home during 
the 18th and 19th century, and how the concept of “a man’s home is his castle” has provided an 
unmanageable standard for the courts).  Privacy is a widely held right throughout the world.  See 79 
C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 32 (2002) (defining the home with regard to the constitutional 
protections offered). 
 190. William C. Heffernan, Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2002) (discussing the Supreme Court’s conservative approach to interpretations of 
privacy); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-86 (1965) (discussing the various ways in 
which privacy is incorporated into our Constitution). 
 191. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 
90 CAL L. REV. 1087 (2002) (providing an analysis of historical approaches to discussing privacy 
and arguing for a pragmatic approach to determining privacy).  The right to privacy can be infringed 
upon in other domains.  Amitai Etzioni, The Right to Privacy vs. the Common Good, U.S.A. TODAY 
MAGAZINE Sept. 2000, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/etzioni/B338.html (last visited Feb. 
9, 2003) (discussing drug testing as a violation of the right to privacy from philosophical 
approaches); Jessica Reaves, Does a Sex Offender Have a Right to Privacy?, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/04/20/megan4_20.a.tm/index.html (last visited April 20, 2000) 
(discussing how certain State laws dealing with the reporting of sex offenders may infringe on the 
offenders’ right to privacy). 
 192. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).  In discussing the rationale behind 
their decision the Court noted: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is 
not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable 
men draw from evidence.  Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be 
drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. 
Id. 
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number of exceptions to the warrant rule will affect our right to privacy 
in our homes.193  The Flinchum holding leaves open the possibility that 
an officer may break down the door of any home if he or she is in hot 
pursuit and reasonably believes the suspect is inside.194 
When we analyze the Ohio Supreme Court’s approach we see that a 
limited increase in benefits occurs, but the overly broad holding 
disproportionately increases potential consequences, as well.195  
Therefore it cannot be said that the government interest outweighs the 
right to privacy, regardless of the underlying offense.196 
D.  Consequences of Flinchum 
1.  Erosion of Fourth Amendment Principles of Reasonableness 
The Flinchum decision grants another exception to the knock-and-
announce rule.197  The knock-and-announce rule ensures that a search 
 
 193. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984) (stating that “a principal protection against 
unnecessary intrusions into private dwellings is the warrant requirement imposed by the Fourth 
Amendment on agents of the government who seek to enter the home for purposes of search or 
arrest”). 
 194. See supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text discussing the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in State v. Flinchum. 
 195. See the Ohio Supreme Court’s reasoning at supra notes 114-21 and accompanying text.  
See Charles Hellman, Note, Secure in Their Houses? Fourth Amendment Rights at Public Housing 
Projects, 40 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 189 (1995).  The author discussed the great amount of violence 
in Chicago Public Housing, which prompted “Operation Clean Sweep.”  Id. at 189-90.  This 
operation allowed officers to enter each building in an effort to curb the violence and tensions, 
regardless of whether permission was given or if the resident was home.  Id. at 190.  In August 
1995, “Operation Clean Sweep” was banned as it was found to violate the Fourth Amendment.  Id. 
at 190-91. 
 196. See supra notes 163-87 and accompanying text discussing potential benefits from the rule 
announced in Flinchum.  The proposed benefits from applying the hot pursuit doctrine to all crimes 
regardless of the underlying offense seem to be illusory and disproportionately increases the 
consequences without increasing the benefits.  Id. 
 197. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.12 (Anderson 2003) provides: 
When making an arrest or executing an arrest warrant or summons in lieu of an arrest 
warrant, or when executing a search warrant, the peace officer, law enforcement officer, 
or other authorized individual making the arrest or executing the arrest or summons may 
break down an outer or inner door or window of a dwelling house or other building, if 
after notice of his intention to make the arrest or to execute the warrant or summons, he 
is refused admittance . . . . 
Id. Bryan Murray, Note, After United States v. Vaneaton, Does Payton v. New York Prevent Police 
From Making Warrantless Routine Arrests Inside the Home?, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 135, 
135-36 (1996).  “[T]he Ninth Circuit held that police did not violate the Fourth Amendment . . . by 
making a warrantless arrest of a suspect who answered his door in response to their knock.”  Id. at 
135.  “In so holding, the Ninth Circuit ignored the firm line drawn in Payton by allowing a 
warrantless entry into a dwelling so long as police use no coercion and announce the arrest before 
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will be reasonable; however, Flinchum fails to provide any assurance of 
reasonableness.198  The Ohio Supreme Court attempted to minimize its 
decision in the opinion’s closing sentence, which claims that officers do 
not have unbridled authority to disregard the Fourth Amendment.199 
Unfortunately, applications of Flinchum show otherwise.  For 
example, in State v. Stuber, police officers approached Stuber in his 
driveway and stated they had a bench warrant for a minor traffic 
offense.200  Stuber then entered his residence and locked the doors but 
officers forced the door open and arrested him.201  The Ohio appellate 
court relied on Flinchum in upholding the officer’s actions, thus showing 
officers have the power to disregard the warrant requirement anytime 
 
stepping inside.”  Id. at 136 
 198. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).  In reviewing the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court’s blanket exception to the knock and announce rule in drug cases, the Court stated that in 
“each case, it is the duty of a court confronted with the question to determine whether the facts and 
circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce 
requirement.”  Id.  See also Randall S. Bethune, Note, The Exclusionary Rule and the Knock-and-
Announce Violation: Unreasonable Remedy for an Otherwise Reasonable Search Warrant 
Execution, 22 WHITIER L. REV. 879 (2001).  The author recognized the importance of the 
requirement by stating: 
It is a long-standing principle in society and in law that a man’s home is his domain, 
providing both security and sanctity. Our law honors that notion by prohibiting 
government officials from entering one’s home without a warrant approved by a 
magistrate.  Even when government officials possess a valid search or arrest warrant, the 
law underscores the importance of the right to privacy in the home by requiring 
government officials to knock and announce their presence and purpose. 
Id. at 879.  Mark Josephson, Fourth Amendment: Must Police Knock and Announce Themselves 
Before Kicking in the Door of a House?, 86 J. CRIM. L.  & CRIMINOLOGY 1229, 1235-38 (1996) 
(discussing how the framers were in general agreement that the knock-and-announce requirement 
was an important part of their English heritage). 
 199. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002) (stating that “[i]n so holding, we do 
not give law enforcement unbridled authority to enter a suspect’s residence at whim or with blatant 
disregard for the constraints of the Fourth Amendment, but rather limited to situations present in 
today’s case”).  Goddard, supra note 29, at 462 (finding that “early common-law exceptions 
involved either imminent bodily danger to the officers or the suspect’s knowledge of an officer’s 
presence and purpose,” therefore “early American courts . . . narrowly construed the type of exigent 
circumstances that would constitute exceptions to the knock and announce rule”), cited in Maclin, 
supra note 30, at 914 n.76 (discussing the history of the Fourth Amendment and recent Supreme 
Court cases dealing with history). 
 200. State v. Stuber, No. 1-02-20, 2002 WL 31618993, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. Nov. 21, 
2002). 
 201. Id.  Lisa Ruddy, Note & Comment, From Seat Belts to Handcuffs: May Police Arrest for 
Minor Traffic Violations?, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 479 (2002).  “[T]wenty-eight 
states permit a police officer to place otherwise law-abiding citizens under full custodial arrest.”  Id. 
at 479.  See Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte Blanche, 
77 IND. L.J. 419 (2002) (discussing the Atwater v. Lago Vista case and its relation to arrests for 
minor offenses). 
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their authority is ignored.202 
2.  Police Misconduct 
The Ohio Supreme Court’s reasoning assumes that innocent people 
do not run from the police.  This ignores the severe racial problems 
associated with law enforcement203 and the great deal of fear associated 
with arrest.204  Certainly race problems are not foreign to Ohio.  For 
example, Cincinnati erupted in protests after the shooting of Timothy 
Thomas in April 2001.205  Thomas was being pursued for several 
misdemeanor violations and was shot unarmed.206  Furthermore, it is 
 
 202. Stuber, 2002 WL 31618993, at *3.  The court declined to determine whether the officer’s 
entry was reasonable under O.R.C. 2935.12(A), which requires officers to knock-and-announce 
prior to forcing there way into a home.  Id. at *2. 
 203. Lewis Katz, Anti-Terrorism Laws: Too Much of a Good Thing, available at 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew39.htm (last visited November 24, 2001) (discussing the 
Fourth Amendment in the wake of September 11, 2001); William J. Stuntz, Local Policing after the 
Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2179 (2002).  Even those who regard racial or ethnic profiling as 
occasionally tolerable must agree that it is a very bad thing.  Id.  It depends on the balance of the 
benefits to law enforcement from using race as a proxy and the harm to the group affected by the 
profiling.  Id  Consequently, police are likely to take race and ethnicity into account even when 
doing so is socially harmful.  Id.  One is left with a world in which a lot of profiling is both socially 
destructive and impossible to prevent.  Id.  Timothy P. O’Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Probable 
Cause, Beyond the Fourth Amendment: New Strategies for Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 693 (1998) (discussing use of minor traffic violations as a pretext for otherwise invalid 
searches and seizures).  See also Matthew S. Crider, Note, Criminal Procedure—Searches and 
Seizures—Police Officers Must Meet “Reasonable Officer” Standard to Withstand Pretext Claim, 
36 S. TEX. L. REV. 629 (1995) (discussing the modified objective or the reasonable officer approach 
with respect to pretext cases). 
 204. Schroeder, supra note 130, at 798-801.  Discussing the great fear associated with arrest: 
A custodial arrest is an especially “awesome and frightening” experience.  The arrestee 
is abruptly constrained and usually searched, even if the arrest is for a minor offense. He 
is then forcibly taken to an unfamiliar place, booked, fingerprinted, photographed, 
searched more extensively, and held in jail, possibly under unsanitary and unsafe 
conditions, until, and unless, he can obtain his release. The arrestee may suffer emotional 
distress and public humiliation, and may lose contact with family and friends. He may 
lose time from work and will probably be required to retain an attorney and spend money 
on bail. If the detention is at all prolonged, he may lose his job or suffer other adverse 
consequences. If a person charged with a misdemeanor is subjected to a custodial arrest, 
that arrest is likely to be the major consequence suffered by that person. 
Id. 
 205. Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: from Elian to the Internment 
70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2257 (2002)  (claiming “the shooting sparked protests in Cincinnati’s 
African-American community, as protesters alleged that the officers used excessive force because of 
Thomas’s race”) (citing Francis X. Clines, In Aftershock of Unrest, Cincinnati Seeks Answers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2001, at A11  (suggesting protests partly sparked by concerns that the Thomas 
shooting was the latest in a long line of excessive force cases)). 
 206. Taslitz, supra note 205 (noting that Thomas was the fourth black male killed since 1995 
and that no white suspects had been shot during the same period). 
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very common to experience fear when one is being arrested.  In fact, a 
black social worker cited for speeding is now petrified every time she 
sees a police car in her rearview mirror.207  She stated, “[i]n that one 
brief encounter, her entire sense of herself— her job, the fact that she is 
a mother and an educated, law-abiding person working on a master’s 
degree—was stripped away.”208 A forty-one year old black male who 
was consistently pulled over by police put it best: “[t]hey have the power 
and they can do whatever they want to do to you for that period of 
time . . . . You’re never beyond this, because of the color of your skin.” 
209  The fear associated with arrest is not limited to blacks, but rather is 
generally experienced by all minorities.210 
It is no secret that our society deals with police corruption and 
abuse on a daily basis.211  In 1931, a National Commission found 
extensive evidence of police lawlessness, including unnecessary 
violence.212  In 1961, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights found that 
police brutality is a serious and continuing problem.213  Most recently 
 
 207. Id. at 2260.  Suzanne Leone, Massachusetts Addresses Racial Profiling Head On: The 
Efficiency of Chapter 228 of the Acts and Resolves of 2000, 28 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 335 (2002) (discussing how the Massachusetts Legislature is dealing with racial 
profiling).  Alberto B. Lopez, Racial Profiling and Whren: Searching for Objective Evidence of the 
Fourth Amendment on the Nation’s Roads, 90 KY. L.J. 75 (2002) (discussing recent Presidential 
concern over racial profiling and Congressional pressures to solve this problem). 
 208. Taslitz, supra note 205, at 2260 (citing  KENNETH MEEKS, DRIVING WHILE BLACK: 
HIGHWAYS, SHOPPING MALLS, TAXICABS, SIDEWALKS: HOW TO FIGHT BACK IF YOU ARE A 
VICTIM OF RACIAL PROFILING 3-20, 63-157 (2000)).  Statistics taken from major Ohio cities 
including Toledo, Akron, Cleveland, and Columbus, have shown that blacks are twice as likely to 
be ticketed than whites.  David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving 
While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 266-67 (1999). 
 209. Taslitz, supra note 205, at 2260 (citing Harris, supra note 208, at 272-73 quoting 
Interview by David Harris with Michael in Toledo, Ohio (Oct. 1, 1998)).  See Devon W. Carbado, 
(E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002) (providing an in depth look at 
race and its relation to the Fourth Amendment). 
 210. See Theodore W. Maya, Comment, To Serve and Protect or to Betray and Neglect?  The 
LAPD and Undocumented Immigrants, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1611 (2002) (explaining the problems 
experienced by immigrants in Los Angeles, California). 
 211. Hess, supra note 10, at 150 (finding that while a certain level of abuse exists, the public is 
hesitant to picture the abused as victims).  See also Tracey L. Meares, Praying for Community 
Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593 (2002) (providing an alternative to traditional methods of police 
operation). 
 212. NATIONAL COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON 
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 153-56 (1931), reprinted in THE THIRD DEGREE: MASS 
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (Zechariah Chafee, Jr. et al. eds., 1969).  See Harold A. Mcdougall, For 
Critical Race Practitioners: RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (4th Ed.) By Derrick A. Bell, Jr., 46 
HOW. L.J. 1 (2002) (summarizing the arguments in the civil rights case book RACE, RACISM, AND 
AMERICAN LAW). 
 213. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, 1961 COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, BOOK V. 
JUSTICE 26 (1961).  See Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment 
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the U.S. General Accounting Office noted that various sources have 
recommended independent federal monitors to prevent police 
corruption.214  As we have seen, the rule announced in Flinchum allows 
police to circumvent various Fourth Amendment protections.215  
Additionally, increases in police power are likely to escalate the number 
of Section 1983 lawsuits filed against law enforcement.216 
3.  Danger to Third Parties 
In Flinchum, the officers were not sure what residence Flinchum 
entered until they viewed him standing in the kitchen.  The officers 
could not have known whether the house belonged to Flinchum or to a 
 
Unreasonableness in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329 (2002) (arguing that 
broad arrest power creates the potential for police abuse because of the large amount of traffic 
laws). 
 214. Jenny Rivera, Extra! Extra! Read All About it: What a Plaintiff “Knows or Should Know” 
Based on Officials’ Statements and Media Coverage of Police Misconduct for Notice of a § 1983 
Municipal Liability Claim, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 505, 506 (2000).  As investigative committees 
have identified and highlighted the link between police corruption and police brutality, requests for 
external controls have increased. Indeed, calls for independent federal monitors in cases of police 
brutality reflect the dissatisfaction with, and intolerance of, police misconduct and abuse, as well as 
the growing recognition that local police departments do not or cannot police themselves. 
Id. (citing U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO Report, Law Enforcement: Information on Drug-
Related Police Corruption: Report to the Honorable Charles B. Rangel, House of Representatives 
(1998) (noting that various sources have recommended external oversight of police departments)).  
See also Jennifer E. Koepke, The Failure to Breach the Blue Wall of Silence: The Circling of the 
Wagons to Protect Police Perjury, 39 Washburn L.J. 211, 221 (2000) (discussing the rise of police 
perjury associated with police corruption).  Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth 
Amendment, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1468 (1985) (providing two theoretical models to approach the 
Fourth Amendment analysis of police conduct in searches and seizures). 
 215. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text discussing the need to consider the 
underlying offense in determining exigent circumstances.  See supra notes 197-202 and 
accompanying text discussing the knock-and-announce requirement.  See infra note 217 and 
accompanying text discussing the need for a warrant before entering the home of a third party.  See 
Skinner, supra note 9 (discussing how New Jersey Courts have weakened the Fourth Amendment 
protections by allowing officers to enter a home without knocking and announcing when they have 
an arrest warrant regardless of the underlying offense); Driscoll, supra note 10, at 2 (discussing 
exception to the knock-and-announce rule has created a disturbing pattern of police raids); 
Fernandez, supra note 133, at 837 (stating that “[i]n creating an “easily administrable” rule for 
warrantless misdemeanor arrests, the instant Court has paved the path to police abuse by affording 
law enforcement officials unlimited discretion”). 
 216. See Thorne Clark, Protection from Protection: Section 1983 and the ADA’s Implications 
for Devising a Race-Conscious Police Misconduct Statute, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1585 (2002) 
(discussing the life of Henry Dumas, a black author, who was slain by a mistaken N.Y. police 
officer).  Goins, supra note 68 (discussing the liability of law enforcement officers when conducting 
warrantless home entries); See generally Hess, supra note 10 (discussing remedies available for 
police conduct); William J. Stuntz, Terrorism, Federalism, and Police Misconduct, 25 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 665 (2002) (analyzing police problems in relation to the control of law enforcement on 
the state and federal level). 
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third party. 217  Perhaps Flinchum ran into his grandfather’s house.  One 
can only imagine the terror if police kicked down the door and 
entered.218  Assuming Flinchum did run into the home of a third party, 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Steagald requires police to obtain a search 
warrant in order to enter the premises in the absence of exigent 
circumstances.219 
Age can also be a factor leading to fleeing arrest.  For example, 
imagine that your teenager consumes alcohol under the age of twenty-
one.220  Upon seeing a police officer, your child, like most children, runs 
into the house even though the officer yells “Stop.”221  Upon witnessing 
the child enter your home the officer quickly breaks down the door and 
throws your fifteen-year-old down to the ground and cuffs him.222  The 
officer has done nothing wrong under Flinchum because your child 
committed a crime and fled an otherwise lawful arrest.223 
The consequences of such action are grave because it puts officers’ 
lives in danger, citizens’ lives in danger, and further erodes our Fourth 
Amendment rights.224  The Ohio Supreme Court failed to realize that 
there are often innocent people inside homes who may become injured 
as a door is kicked in or if shots are fired.225  In the preceeding example 
 
 217. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 331 (Ohio 2002) (“As the pursuit continued, Officer 
Birch heard a rear screen door slam open on a house that was later determined to be appellant’s.  
The officer then observed appellant standing in his kitchen five feet inside his home.”).  Taslitz, 
supra note 205 (providing stories of police misconduct and its effect on others). 
 218. See, e.g., James Bovard, No-Knock Entries by Police Take Their Toll on Innocent, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 24, 1994, at 18; Christopher Reed, Drugs: Innocent People 
Dying in Brutal War, CALGARY HERALD, Nov. 18, 1993, at A5; Bob Ross, War on Drugs Takes 
Toll on Innocent, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 1993, at 1A. 
 219. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 222 (1981) (holding exigent circumstances are 
necessary to enter the home of a third party even if probable cause is present).  This is 
distinguishable from Flinchum because the underlying offense is relatively minor.  One should note 
that officers relying on statutes to enter the home without a warrant are not necessarily protected 
from a 1983 federal action.  Bell, supra note 45 (discussing potential liability for officers under 
Utah law). 
 220. Underage consumption is a misdemeanor in Ohio under OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
4301.631 (Anderson 2003). 
 221. Compare this example to the facts in Flinchum, supra notes 85-97 and accompanying text. 
 222. In State v. Stuber, No. 1-02-20, 2002 WL 31618993, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 3d Dist. Nov. 
21, 2002), the appellate court refused to consider whether the officers’ method of entry was 
reasonable as it was lawful under Flinchum. 
 223. State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002) (holding “when officers, having 
identified themselves, are in hot pursuit of a suspect who flees to a house in order to avoid arrest, 
the police may enter without a warrant, regardless of whether the offense for which the suspect is 
being arrested is a misdemeanor”). 
 224. Driscoll, supra note 10, at 2. 
 225. Id. at 28.  Arguing: 
[T]he particularized approach limits no-knock entries only to those cases in which a need 
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there could have been children near the door as it came crashing in, not 
to mention an elderly family member witnessing this horrific event.226 
In 1989, Florida police threw flash grenades into the home of a 
sixteen-year-old boy suspected of dealing drugs.227  Confused, the boy’s 
father pulled out a pistol and began to fire at the incoming officers.228  In 
Dorchester, Massachusetts, a seventy-five-year-old retired minister died 
of a heart attack after a police SWAT unit mistakenly broke down the 
door and entered his apartment, unannounced, in a search for illegal 
drugs.229  Some may argue that the U.S. Supreme Court will not uphold 
such a blatant disregard for human rights; however, the Supreme Court 
in Atwater v. Lago Vista merely stated that the officer used poor 
judgment when, in front of her children, he decided to arrest, cuff, 
search, and take a woman to jail for a mere seatbelt violation.230 
4.  Problems Associated with Quick Decision Making 
One of the benefits of the warrant requirement is that the inherent 
passage of time in obtaining a warrant allows tension to subside.  Thus, 
police are less likely to enter the premises in a forceful, violent manner, 
reducing the chance of police brutality.231  Even in the absence of police 
corruption law enforcement errors are likely to be made, and thus we 
should provide a buffer zone to prevent further harm.232 
 
for such an entry can be demonstrated with reference to facts particular to the entry in 
question. By permitting no-knock entries only when there is specific evidence that 
destruction of evidence is otherwise likely, the particularized approach restrains law 
enforcement officers from making unexpected searches. Thus, this approach maximizes 
the virtues of the knock-and-announce principle: protection of privacy; avoidance of 
violence or destruction of property resulting from surprise police entries; and prevention 
of “arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.” 
Id. 
 226. See supra notes 220-22 and accompanying text. 
 227. Joe Hallinan, Gestapo-like Tactics Used in Drug Raids, DES MOINES REGISTER, Nov. 6, 
1993, at 2, cited in Driscoll, supra note 10, at 5. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Toni Locy, Confidence in Informant May Have Hastened Raid, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 2, 
1994, at 19, cited in Driscoll, supra note 10, at 5. 
 230. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text. 
 231. See Simien, supra note 15, at 524 (stating that “the Constitution, which may not be 
changed in the ordinary process, was intended to be a buffer against the injustices caused by the 
swayable passions of the majority”). 
 232. Brady, supra note 25, at 21.  The article presented some of the problems with allowing 
warrantless arrests of misdemeanors: 
The state arrest laws, particularly those authorizing warrantless arrests, have at least 
three immediate consequences. First, the use of warrants for arrest becomes the 
exception, rather than the rule.  Second, the blanket authority of police officers to 
conduct arrests for misdemeanors without warrants undoubtedly results in far more 
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In Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,233 the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated, “[t]he needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension with 
the Constitution’s protections of the individual against certain exercises 
of official power.  It is precisely the predictability of these pressures that 
counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards.”234  This article 
is not meant to portray police officers as bigots and racists in a common 
pursuit to deprive Americans of civil liberties.  In fact, it should be noted 
that the law enforcement occupation throughout the world suffers from a 
great deal of stress.235  Furthermore, in the wake of September 11th, 
Americans developed a much needed respect for law enforcement 
officials.  It is clear, however, that decisions concerning the Fourth 
Amendment are better left to a neutral and detached magistrate.236  
Unfortunately, Flinchum grants law enforcement the power to make 
decisions previously delegated to a neutral magistrate.237 
 
arrests than if a “cooling off” period occurred between the alleged criminal incident and 
the arrest. The Fourth Amendment anticipates the benefit of that interim period— that a 
neutral, detached judicial officer will intervene to determine whether probable cause 
exists for an arrest. Third, such broad police authority coupled with operational stresses 
in the court systems effectively removes the buffer between the government and the 
individuals that the Framers intended the Fourth Amendment to provide. 
Id.  However, some argue that interpretations of the Fourth Amendment rulings such as Flinchum 
are needed to facilitate effective law enforcement.  Skinner, supra note 9, at 1747 (arguing hot 
pursuit of the subject of a warrant is needed in order to prevent hampering of police duties); 
Haberle, supra note 177, at 895 (arguing that a strict application of the exclusionary rule will 
prevent effective law enforcement). 
 233. 413 U.S. 266 (1973). 
 234. Id. at 273.  Bruce T. Moats, Search & Seizure—The Clash Between the Fourth 
Amendment and Society’s Interest in Effective Law Enforcement, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 253, 
270 (1995) (discussing the balancing test courts must engage in when deciding Fourth Amendment 
issues) (quoting Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 273). 
 235. Jennifer Brown et al., Occupational Stress Among Senior Police Officers, BRIT. J. 
PSYCHOL. 31 (Vol. 87 No. 1 1996), available at 1996 WL 10400274 (finding police officers in 
Britain and Germany and various other countries suffer from high levels of stress). 
 236. Logan, supra note 14, at 1292.  The court’s purpose is to act as a buffer which gives effect 
to the rights enumerated in the Constitution.  Id. Daniel L. Rotenberg, On Seizures and Searches, 28 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 323 (1995) (discussing modifications for judicial and police approaches to 
search and seizures). See also William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical 
Searches for Foreign Intelligence Purposes: Executive Order 12,333 and the Fourth Amendment, 
35 CATH. U. L. REV. 97 (1985) (discussing foreign intelligence exceptions to the warrant rule).  
Corey Fleming Hirokawa, Making the “Law of the Land” the Law on the Street: How Police 
Academies Teach Evolving Fourth Amendment Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 295 (2000) (providing an 
analysis of Atlanta police academies’ practices in presenting criminal procedure requirements set by 
the courts). 
 237. See State v. Flinchum, 765 N.E.2d 330, 332 (Ohio 2002).  It seems that prior to Flinchum 
officers would have obtained a warrant prior to entering the home. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
It seems clear the Ohio Supreme Court’s ruling in Flinchum was 
overly broad.  The consequences of such a ruling can be very harsh.  As 
discussed, the ruling gives Ohio law enforcement officers a great deal of 
power, and with such power comes the increased risk of abuse.  
Furthermore, the types of entries allowed under this holding 
unnecessarily endanger the lives of innocent third parties and may also 
cause unnecessary property damage.  Additionally, Flinchum will likely 
increase the number of Section 1983 lawsuits.  These lawsuits may cause 
a financial strain on the state government. 
The benefits of Flinchum appear to be negligible because it is quite 
easy for an officer to obtain a warrant.  The concept of defeating an 
otherwise lawful arrest thus seems misleading.  The only benefit is that 
an officer saves the time it would have taken to get a warrant.  Some 
benefit may be seen in allowing swift law enforcement, but this has 
never been a top priority.  The warrant was created to prevent 
unreasonable government intrusions, thus fostering the right of privacy.  
In fact, the creation of the warrant requirement suggests this privacy 
interest is greater than the need for swift law enforcement action.  By 
allowing hot pursuit to suffice as an exigent circumstance regardless of 
the underlying offense, the court has failed to give sufficient weight to 
the right of privacy. 
Individuals run from police for a variety of reasons, but the court 
seems to assume only the guilty flee.  This assumption causes an error in 
the balancing of the governmental interest and the individual right to 
privacy.  In order to correct this error the court must recognize two 
things.  First, when there is no threat of jail time the inducement to run is 
likely to be low, and thus when it happens it is likely due to other factors 
such as fear or distrust of law enforcement.  Second, when a jailable 
offense is involved the motive to run is increased by the chance of 
escaping jail, not seeking temporary refuge in a home.  Finally, when 
society decides to impose a jail sentence they have decided the act in 
question requires a deprivation in freedom, presumably the balancing 
scales tip in favor of the government when pursuing those likely to have 
committed such offenses.  Thus, a warrant may not be required.  No 
rational generalization exists for non-jailable offenses.  Utilizing these 
principles creates a distinction between non-jailable and jailable 
offenses, which is sufficient justification for allowing hot pursuit of only 
the latter. 
In conclusion, the gravest danger of Flinchum is future extensions 
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of the holding.  It is well known that our Fourth Amendment rights have 
been increasingly eroded over the years.  In order to prevent inaccurate 
interpretations of such cases it is vital that courts rule in a narrow 
fashion.  The Ohio Supreme Court failed to take such precautions and 
has taken a large chunk out of our Fourth Amendment rights in a very 
unpersuasive two-page opinion. 
Nathan Vaughan 
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